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ABSTRACT 
 
On the Use of Cheap Talk in Hypothetical  
Product Valuation: A Field Experiment. (December 2007) 
Andres Silva Montes, B.S., Universidad Catolica de Chile 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr. 
 
Experimental willingness to pay (WTP) studies can be classified as hypothetical or 
non-hypothetical. In a hypothetical study, such as conjoint analysis, a subject does not 
need to make a real economic commitment. In contrast, in a non-hypothetical task such as 
in experimental auctions, a subject may need to actually buy the product. Subjects in 
hypothetical studies tend to overstate their true WTP. Consequently, researchers need to 
correct hypothetical values to obtain reliable WTP estimates. Recently, incentive-aligned 
and cheap talk approaches have been proposed as ways to correct for hypothetical bias. In 
a hypothetical task, a cheap talk script explicitly reminds the subject about the hypothetical 
nature of the task and its expected consequences. In an incentive-aligned task (non-
hypothetical), subjects are randomly selected to physically buy the product. The objective 
of our study is to assess and compare the reduction of hypothetical bias in consumers’ 
willingness to pay for novel products by applying a generic, short, and neutral cheap talk 
script in a retail setting. To accomplish this objective, we employ non-hypothetical, 
hypothetical, and hypothetical with cheap talk treatments in our experimental design.   
We conducted our experimental retail study using conjoint analysis and open-ended 
elicitation mechanisms, utilizing Becker DeGroot Marshak (BDM) mechanism for the 
incentive-aligned treatments. Consistently in both elicitation mechanisms, using seemingly 
unrelated and random-effect Tobit techniques, we find that our cheap talk script is effective 
in eliminating the hypothetical bias. As expected, the hypothetical WTP values are 
significantly higher than the non-hypothetical values but the hypothetical values with 
cheap talk are not significantly different from incentive-aligned or non-hypothetical 
estimates. In addition, we find that open-ended estimates are significantly higher than 
conjoint analysis estimates and that emotions and familiarity can have significant impacts 
on WTP estimates.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last decade, experimental studies have become a popular mechanism to 
test economic theory (e.g. Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze 2003) or to measure willingness to 
pay (WTP) (e.g. Lusk and Hudson 2004b).  An advantage of experimental studies are that 
subjects can be studied in an environment that closely resembles a real situation, while 
allowing the researcher to control the conditions the subjects are facing.  Recently, there 
has been an increasing interest in measuring WTP using experimental approaches. Study of 
WTP methods is warranted when considering the number of new products being constantly 
introduced into the marketplace. This is true wherever these new products are completely 
novel product or an addition/subtraction of attributes from an existing product.   
Following Maynard et al. (2004), WTP experimental studies can be classified as 
hypothetical and non-hypothetical. Hypothetical studies do not require an actual product 
since a transaction does not take place. Therefore, these studies are especially attractive 
when the actual product is not available or prototypes are too costly to produce.  An 
example of a hypothetical approach is the traditional conjoint analysis (CA), which has 
been widely used in marketing research and business applications.  In traditional CA, 
subjects need to rate or rank product profiles (unique combination of attributes).  After 
conducting the survey, the WTP for each attribute is estimated and respondents are 
clustered into various groups (market segments) that share similar characteristics. In non-
hypothetical studies, there is the possibility of a transaction occurring between the 
researcher and the subject, meaning the subject may have to give up something, such as 
money, in exchange for the actual product. An example of the non-hypothetical approach 
is an experimental auction (EA).  
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EA are more commonly conducted in a lab setting rather than in a field setting. In 
general, subjects are endowed with a generic product and receive a cash payment to 
express their WTP to exchange it for a premium good. Later on, we discuss some study 
specifications and their expected effect on the WTP estimations. There are several types of 
auctions where the researcher is interested in incentive-compatible approaches. An 
incentive-compatible auction is designed such that the subject’s best strategy is to truly 
reveal their WTP for the elicited product.  The most appropriate type of auction for a 
particular study is highly dependent on the research objectives and the experimental 
conditions. Recently, Ding, Grewal, and Liechty (2005) introduced incentive-aligned CA, 
which takes advantage of the attribute tradeoffs of CA and the incentive compatibility 
property of EA.  In the literature review section, some advantages and disadvantages of a 
few of the most common types of EA and elicitation mechanisms are reviewed. 
In addition to the type of elicitation mechanism, the researcher needs to decide on 
the experimental conditions. In general, we look for experimental conditions that facilitate 
subject valuation and minimize biases. In the end, our objective is to generate accurate and 
reliable estimations of product valuation. Recent literature has extensively examined 
several experimental situations, including: type of setting (Lusk and Fox 2003) and 
valuation procedures (Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze 2003).   
 
Problem Statement 
It has been suggested that subjects tend to behave differently when they face a 
hypothetical task compared to a real one (Blumenschein et al. 1997; Neill et al. 1994; List 
and Gallet 2001). More specifically, there is strong evidence that subjects overstate their 
true WTP in hypothetical situations. There is a lack of agreement about why respondents 
do this and also how to calibrate their overstated responses (Murphy et al. 2005).  
Consequently, there needs to be a method to identify and control the hypothetical bias. 
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Objectives 
With this in mind, we conducted a set of retail experiments to further evaluate the 
use of hypothetical cheap talk (cheap talk hereafter) to reduce the hypothetical bias using 
different types of elicitation mechanisms, such as open-ended elicitation (OE) and CA.  
Using treatments involving hypothetical, cheap talk, and non-hypothetical tasks, our 
objective is to examine cheap talk’s effectiveness in reducing hypothetical bias in product 
valuation. To our knowledge, there is no prior work that has evaluated the effect of cheap 
talk using different elicitation mechanisms in a retail setting.   
 
Data and Methods 
We conducted our experiments of February 2007 in selected grocery stores in the 
Bryan-College Station area in Texas.  The study was approved by the Office of Research 
Compliance at Texas A&M University (Protocol Number 2006-0703). The dataset 
involved four value-added Texas Rio Star grapefruit products.  The fresh fruit was 
provided by Texas Citrus Mutual and processed on-campus by specialized personnel.  The 
grapefruit were cut in segments or cubes and included preservatives in some cases.  So, we 
elicited WTP values for four value-added grapefruit products: cubes without preservatives, 
cubes with preservatives, segments without preservatives and segments with preservatives. 
The respondent instructions were scripted in order to keep the study as similar as 
possible from one subject to the next.  We randomly conducted the experiments at different 
times of the day, different days of the week, and at selected supermarkets. We obtained 
demographic, consumption, and attitudinal information from the subjects who expressed 
their WTP for each of the four products.   
In the literature review section, we discuss some of the most popular elicitation 
mechanisms. After that, in the methodology section, we explain and justify the study 
specifications for OE and CA.  Basically, in the OE approach, subjects directly state their 
WTP.  However, in the CA treatments, subjects rate a set of product profiles. For each type 
of elicitation mechanism we have four treatments. Consequently, in total, we have two 
types of elicitation mechanisms and eight treatments. The product profiles were displayed 
as pictures and labeled with the type of product on the top of each picture to ensure that the 
subjects completely understood which product was under study.  Pictures were used to 
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limit any variation among product samples and were also used to vary the attribute levels 
being tested.  However, subjects were made aware that despite the use of pictures, bids 
were binding and the participant might have to exchange money for a randomly selected 
good, depending on the elicitation mechanism. For CA, the actual number of product 
profiles had an orthogonal design, which assures that we had enough profiles to compute 
individual attribute value estimates.  Finally, since the WTP data are censored to zero and 
we asked for more than one price per subject, we analyzed the data using a system of 
equations as seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) and random-effect Tobit model.  Using 
both hypothetical and non-hypothetical designs of OE and CA elicitation mechanisms, we 
were able to evaluate how cheap talk can effectively reduce hypothetical bias in 
hypothetical product valuation.   
 
Expected Results 
In the literature, there is evidence, mostly in lab settings, that the provision of cheap 
talk in hypothetical valuation and the use of incentive-aligned non-hypothetical 
mechanisms are effective in eliminating hypothetical bias.  Consequently, we expect that 
both mechanisms would generate significantly more realistic WTP estimates than the 
hypothetical treatments, without a significant difference between them.   
Our findings can have managerial implications.  First, decision makers will have 
evidence to validate the use of cheap talk to reduce hypothetical bias for environmental and 
hypothetical new product valuation applications. Second, we will be able to determine 
whether the incentive-aligned CA and OE approaches offer a significant improvement with 
respect to the cheap talk approach in terms of reducing the hypothetical bias in product 
valuation.   
  
Organization of Remaining Chapters 
This thesis is organized as follows. First, we identify the hypothetical bias problem 
in experimental economics. Second, we describe some of the aspects that need to be 
considered when designing an experimental study, including the type of subject, nature of 
the task, and type of setting. In the discussion regarding the elicitation mechanism, we 
highlight the relevant research within the areas of EA and CA, giving emphasis to areas of 
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ongoing research regarding measurement of WTP.  In particular, we revisit the literature 
on cheap talk and the incentive-aligned approach by Ding, Grewal, and Liechty (2005). 
Third, in the theoretical framework section, we discuss the theory behind EA and CA. 
Fourth, in the empirical model section, we justify the use of SUR and the random-effect 
Tobit model used to analyze the dataset.  In addition, we present the experimental 
specifications.  Fifth, we present and explain our results.  Sixth, we discuss our findings, 
their economic and managerial implications, with recommendations for future research.  
Finally, the appendix section includes the original questionnaires (Appendix A), cheap talk 
script (Appendix B), and instruction per treatment (Appendix C). 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Carpenter, Harrison and List (2005) indicate that some of the most important 
factors that can be used to determine the field context of an experiment are subject 
background (previous experiences and information), type of commodity, nature of the pool 
of subjects, study environment, and tasks. The following is a review of some of the most 
relevant work that has been done within experimental economics focusing on the last three 
points, which are intrinsic to our study.   
 
Nature of Pool of Subjects   
Students are widely used in experimental economics since they are easily prepared 
and convenient to recruit. In the academic literature, Harrison and List (2004) identify the 
main issues of working with students. They note that students are non-representative 
sample (due to selection bias) and that findings based on such as sample are difficult to 
extrapolate to the rest of the population.  The result is a lack of external validity 
(Carpenter, Harrison and List 2005).  According to Harrison and List (2004), most of the 
selection bias can be corrected by including explanatory variables (e.g. demographics) in 
the statistical model. However, it is still difficult to predict the behavior of a population 
based on a model that was developed from a small segment or portion of the population.  
In other words, interpolation generates a more accurate prediction than extrapolation 
(Harrison and List 2004). In our study, we use retail walk-in subjects selected in grocery 
stores.  Supermarket shoppers can be more difficult to recruit than students; however, this 
allows us to expand the range of demographic characteristics. 
 
Nature of the Environment  
The setting in which an experiment is conducted has also been shown to influence 
WTP values. A more realistic setting tends to help participants behave as if they were 
making a real buying decision. Every market setting has unique characteristics that provide 
advantages and disadvantages. For instance, a retail setting allows recruitment of a larger 
sample size, a wider range of demographic characteristics, minimization of the recruiter 
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payment, and also allows the study to be conducted in a place where decisions are actually 
being made (i.e., a grocery store).  However, it is more difficult to ensure the subject 
actually reads all of the information that is important to the study, which makes it harder to 
employ more demanding protocols. With regards to lab settings, more sophisticated 
experiments can be conducted since there are usually fewer distractions and fewer time 
constraints. However, lab settings usually provide a hypothetical buying situation and 
participants may not want the product being offered.  In setting up an experiment, the 
advantages and disadvantages of each setting must be weighed in order to pick which 
setting is most appropriate for the problem at hand. 
 In the literature, Shogren et al. (1999) compared mail, lab, and retail study formats. 
They estimated the WTP for an irradiated chicken product using four sets of prices.  The 
authors found that respondents within the mail group expressed a highest WTP and 
acceptance rate for irradiated chicken. Furthermore, the main difference between the lab 
and the retail setting was that in the retail setting, most of the people did not read the 
available information about irradiated food.  This finding is especially relevant since 
information helps to change attitudes about irradiated food and a positive attitude may lead 
to increased purchase behavior.  
Comparing in-lab and retail settings, Lusk and Fox (2003) did not find a significant 
difference in bids after controlling for demographic differences.  However, when 
comparing non-zero bids, retail valuations were significantly higher than the lab 
valuations.  The authors explain that WTP should increase when consumers are certain 
about a good’s value.  Another possibility that is not presented in the paper is that more 
people bid zero in a retail setting and a higher bid values could be a product of a biased 
selection sample.   
In addition, the higher WTP in lab valuation exercises compared to actual retail 
exercises could be associated with the novelty of the product more than inexperience with 
the elicitation procedure (Shogren, List and Hayes 2000). Consequently, we would expect 
that subject bids should be stable for familiar goods and decline for unfamiliar goods.  This 
fact was tested by Shogren, List and Hayes (2000) using candy bars, mango, and irradiated 
pork meat, expected to generate different levels of familiarity by the subjects. They found 
that the novelty of a product or preference for the learning process had a significant effect 
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on the results. In other words, subjects bid higher for a new good in order to see how the 
good fit into their preference set.  
Some hypothetical tasks have been criticized based on the lack of realism. The 
argument here is that subjects behave differently when they feel that they are not in a real 
purchase situation.  Incentive-aligned approaches have been proposed to overcome this 
hypothetical bias. Incentive-aligned techniques involve a hypothetical situation where and 
some subjects are randomly selected to buy the elicited good.  Some examples in the 
literature can be found in the work of Voelckner (2006), who randomly selected ten 
percent of the subjects to actually buy their prior choice, which significantly reduced the 
bias of the hypothetical setting. Lusk and Schroeder (2004), comparing hypothetical and 
non-hypothetical choice based responses, found that subjects overestimated the probability 
of purchasing an elicited good and their WTP in a hypothetical setting, compared to an 
incentive-aligned one. However, the WTP for a marginal change of product attributes 
converged in both mechanisms.   
Alfnes et al. (2006) modified the Lusk and Schroeder (2004) protocol in order to 
measure the WTP for artificial color in salmon, using different levels of information and 
22 choice scenarios with different combinations of colors and prices. At the end of the 
experiment, each subject randomly determined their binding scenario. Finally, Ding, 
Grewal, and Liechty (2005) found that when they compared incentive-aligned, 
hypothetical CA to contingent valuation (CV), the incentive-aligned mechanisms 
generated significantly lower WTP estimates than the hypothetical approaches. In 
summary, incentive-aligned procedures take advantage of an incentive-compatible 
elicitation protocol that may involve the availability of substitutes in CA; consequently, 
subjects can make decisions in a more realistic setting. In the remaining part of this 
section, we review cheap talk as a technique that can be used to reduce or eliminate 
hypothetical bias. Later, we apply this technique in a retail environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Nature of the Task 
There are numerous means by which to measure WTP. Three of the most common 
are CV, EA, and CA. With respect to CV, there is evidence that this approach 
overestimates WTP values. Brown, Ajzen and Hrubes (2003) argued that overestimation 
occurs due to hypothetical bias. Blumenschein et al. (1997), compared real and 
hypothetical second-price EA, and provided empirical evidence that EA produce 
significant overestimation of results. In some cases, although working in a hypothetical 
setting, hypothetical answers can be informative when the bias is systematic and 
predictable (Blackburn, Harrison and Rutstrom 1994). List and Gallet (2001) found that 
hypothetical WTP values need to be calibrated by a factor between 1.26 and 1.30 to get an 
estimate of the actual value. Type of good (public/private), elicitation mechanism and type 
of study (willingness to pay/accept) were taken into account to estimate the appropriate 
calibration factor. Thus, identifying the bias pattern based on demographic characteristics 
can allow us to correctly analyze other sample sets. Blackburn, Harrison and Rutstrom 
(1994) used dichotomic questions for three goods and tried to predict bias patterns in 
hypothetical and non-hypothetical contexts. Their results indicate that it was possible to 
predict responses with some accuracy; however, more experiments are needed to have 
more robust conclusions. In the following paragraphs, we describe EA and CA as 
methodologies used to elicit WTP values. 
 
Experimental Auctions 
Since non-hypothetical CV studies can be difficult to conduct, EA have been 
presented as a means to estimate a more realistic WTP for novel products. Lusk (2003b) 
reviewed some advantages and disadvantages of EA, CV, and CA approaches. The author 
identified several advantages of EA, such as the use of an active market environment 
where feedback can be attained. The active market allows subjects to face real decisions 
due to the use of money and goods. However, a couple of disadvantages to EA exist. 
Notably, many actual products may be needed, depending on the auction type used and the 
difficulty of creating substitutes in a realistic setting. EA procedures have especially 
become a popular method for eliciting WTP values for new product attributes, and for 
examining several aspects of economic theory (e.g. Chow and Sarin 2001). However, most 
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applications have taken place in lab settings rather than in retail settings (see Wertenbroch 
and Skiera 2002). Lusk, Feldkamp and Schroeder (2004) conducted a study to compare the 
performance of four of the most common experimental mechanisms: English, Becker 
DeGroot Marshak mechanism (BDM hereafter), second-price (also known as Vickrey), 
and nth price auctions.   
In a standard EA procedure, subjects are randomly assigned to either a particular 
group (or treatment) or a control group. Each group is exposed to a different level of 
information (e.g. Fox, Hayes and Shogren 2002), endowment (e.g. Loureiro, Umberger 
and Hine 2003), setting or task (e.g. Voelckner 2006). Subjects express their WTP by 
submitting a bid for the elicited product in each of the rounds, and at the end, one of the 
rounds is randomly chosen as the binding round.  For the selected round, the auction 
winners have to buy the product and pay the market price. In the English auction, the 
subject with the highest bid gets the product and pays his stated price. In the second-price 
auction, the subject with the highest bid gets the product and pays the second highest price.  
In the nth price auction, the n-1 subject with the highest bid gets the product and pays the 
market price that is determined randomly (nth price auction). In the BDM mechanism, the 
market price is randomly drawn and the subject is able to purchase the good only if their 
bid is larger than or equal to the market price. Second-price auction, nth price auction, and 
the BDM mechanism are incentive-compatible mechanisms.  In other words, the subject’s 
best strategy is to reveal their true WTP.  For example, if a bidder bids an amount that is 
lower than their true WTP, the chance of being able to purchase the good is lowered, while 
bidding a higher amount increases the chance that the bidder will have to purchase the 
good at a price that is higher than what they truly want to spend. However, each elicitation 
mechanism has some limitations. For instance, the BDM mechanism has no market 
feedback. In repeated trials, a market-like learning experience helps subjects to show their 
true preferences and reveal their demand for the good (Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze 2003).  
However, the BDM mechanism allows us to elicit WTP for each subject while maintaining 
its incentive compatibility.     
Lusk, Feldkamp and Schroeder (2004) carried out a multiple good valuation using 
four types of auctions: English, BDM, second-price, and nth price. In multiple good 
valuations, the authors identify a disadvantage in the form of a possible demand reduction 
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or wealth effect.  In other words, once some subjects get an auctioned good, they will 
reduce their demand in the next round.  A way to avoid this problem is to randomly choose 
the binding round, as proposed in the nth price auction.   
In general, an endowment can be used in two ways in EA.  First, subjects may 
receive an endowed good (typically a basic pre-existing substitute) and then are asked to 
bid to exchange their endowed good for the good of interest (premium product). This also 
called the endow-and-upgrade method by Corrigan and Rousu (2006a). Second, subjects 
can bid directly on several competing goods and a random drawing can be used to 
determine which good is binding (must be purchased), so that demand for a single unit can 
be elicited.   
In the literature, endowment effects have been described as the difference between 
bids by those endowed with a good and those not given an endowment before bidding.  
Rutstrom (1998) identified two effects associated with participation fees in an 
experimental study.  First, the income effect, which is based on the subject’s increased 
income, is expected to be low considering the allocation of goods. Second the selection 
effect considers that subjects need different levels of monetary compensation for different 
goods.  So, the higher participation fee the more likely we will attract a subject with a 
higher opportunity cost. Regarding the selection effect, authors found that the effect on the 
residual variance is not constant over elicitation mechanisms. Particularly, for the income 
effect, the study identified both an expected and unexpected income. The expected income 
was the known participation fee, and later in the study, the unexpected income was the 
random income assignment. With respect to income effect, they found that an unexpected 
endowment was translated into a larger residual variance of the bid, and the expected 
endowment had no significant effect on the average bid or its residual variances.  
Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) suggested not giving any compensation to 
participants as a way to avoid distortions that can lead to overbidding.  They conducted a 
point-of-purchase experiment in which their recruited participants were not significantly 
compensated.   However, when subjects are not endowed with money, it can be a liquidity 
constraint is stronger, and specially, to buy big items.  In other words, subjects do not have 
enough cash to buy the elicited good even when they want to purchase the good.  The 
authors advised that this issue can be avoided by allowing subjects to pay with a check, 
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credit card, or by taking a loan from the researchers. Alternatively, incentive participation 
that does not affect the budget constraint can be implemented by compensating subjects via 
a donation to a third party, such as a church or another similar institution (Cummings, 
Harrison, and Rutstrom 1995).   
Loureiro, Umberger and Hine (2003) designed an experiment to test whether three 
levels of monetary endowments would cause significantly different bids.  Participants were 
divided into groups and compensated with two, four, or six dollars. Results indicated that 
the participants of groups endowed with four and six dollars bid significantly higher than 
subjects receiving two dollars. Thus, the endowment level had a significantly positive 
influence on the bid level.  Finally, they concluded that endowments close to the value of 
the auctioned good should not have a significant impact on the experimental design.  They 
suggested that participants should bid and then receive final payment at the end of the 
experiment.  In addition, in order to minimize the overbidding behavior, the authors 
recommended that participants should receive an initial monetary compensation to use in 
the study task and then a participation fee at the end of the session.   
Lusk, Feldkamp and Schroeder (2004) measured the endowment effect using beef 
steaks as a product.  Their experiment involved using two sets of treatments.  First, 
respondents were either endowed with or without a steak.  The second treatment was an 
assignment to an elicitation mechanism: English, BDM, second-price, and nth price 
auction. Results indicated that the endowment effect was not consistent across elicitation 
mechanisms. However, for the nth price auction, WTP was significantly lower in the 
endowment treatment, consistent with loss aversion theory. The subjects valued the 
endowed good more and bid less in order to get a new one. The opposite was found for the 
second-price auction, which is consistent with previous research.   
Corrigan and Rousu (2006a) also examined endowment effects by utilizing a 
similar design to that used by Lusk, Feldkamp and Schroeder (2004).  Their protocol 
differed in that subjects were endowed with a bottle of salsa and subjects bid to obtain a 
second bottle of the same good.  By doing this, the endowment effect was isolated, and 
loss aversion behavior was avoided.  Their results indicated that WTP for a second unit of 
the good was 75% higher when subjects were initially endowed. The highest differences in 
WTP occurred between the nth price and second-price auctions. The authors explained that 
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the higher valuation is a reciprocal obligation effect.  In other words, subjects felt 
committed to the researcher who just endowed them with a good. This effect will have the 
opposite effect rather than the described loss aversion behavior. Consequently, the final 
effect is ambiguous and will depend mainly on the auction design.   
In the substitution area, Marette et al. (2006) developed an experiment to estimate 
the substitution between two imperfect substitutes and computed the WTP with different 
levels of health information in France. The experiment involved cans of tuna and sardines.  
Tuna is known as having higher levels of mercury and lower levels of beneficial omega-3 
fatty acids; however, it is consumed more frequently than sardines.  Some subjects were 
endowed with six cans of tuna and others with six cans of sardines. Subjects were then 
asked to exchange their endowed good for the good they were not endowed with in order 
to find the point of indifference. Using the point of indifference, they computed WTP 
estimates. The substitution rate was affected by the type of information presented and its 
order of presentation. Therefore, the authors recommended presenting the benefits before 
the risk information to assure that the benefit information is absorbed, since the risk 
information, in any order, would still be considered.   
Lusk, Feldkamp and Schroeder (2004) found that the WTP for a particular steak 
was not significantly altered by the presence of other types of steaks. Corrigan and Rousu 
(2006a) explained that bidding for two goods separately can lead to avoidance of the 
endowment effect.  The authors found that the WTP estimations change significantly when 
the subjects are endowed with a good.  So, the endow-and-upgrade method can be the 
cause of misleading estimates of a good’s premium.   
Lusk and Hudson (2004b) compared methods to compute WTP and indicated how 
some of the work in experimental and environmental economics can be applied to an 
agribusiness context. They presented the significance of cross-price effects in measuring 
WTP.  They found that the market price information about substitutes significantly affects 
the WTP for a novel product.  The cross-price effect was computed in two ways. First, 
subjects bid with and without the presence of a substitute/complementary good.  Second, 
the novel good was auctioned and the substitute good was also available at a posted selling 
price. The selling price of the substitute good was varied to analyze the impact on changing 
bids. However, it is possible to have some incentive compatibility issues. In the authors’ 
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opinion, if the cross-price effect is not considered, there will be a decrease of the decision 
power of the findings by the business. In summary, with regards to the substitution effect, 
there is experimental evidence that the presence of substitutes affects WTP estimations. In 
the discussion section, we use this evidence to explain some of our experimental findings.   
 
Conjoint Analysis  
The concept of CA relies completely on the fact that demand for a product is based 
on the set of attributes that make up the product.  According to Lancaster (1966), 
consumers maximize utility subject to a budget constraint and a technology level. A 
product is composed of a bundle of attributes that can exist in more than one product. An 
attribute, not a good, provides utility to the consumer. Therefore, the marginal utility of a 
good can be expressed as the weighted marginal utility of the attributes.     
CA requires participants to evaluate several product profiles, with each profile 
made up of a unique level combination of the same attributes that mimic a real buying 
decision. For example, color is an attribute, while blue, red, and green are levels. The main 
difference between CA and other WTP elicitation mechanisms like open CV and EA, is 
that price values are provided.  In a standard CA, the most important attributes and their 
levels should be included within the profiles to be evaluated.  Some examples of CA 
studies include: valuations of value-added citrus (Campbell et al. 2006), external citrus 
appearance (Campbell et al. 2004), genetically modified organisms (Baker and Burnham 
2001), edible flowers (Kelley et al. 2002), and food quality labels (Fotopoulos and 
Krystallis 2001).  By evaluating several products with various attribute combinations, it is 
possible to estimate the WTP for each attribute and its levels.   
According to Green, Kreiger, and Wind (2001), CA is “by far, the most used 
marketing research tool for analyzing consumer tradeoffs.”  The main reason for CA 
popularity is its ease of collecting WTP estimates and obtaining market segmentation 
results.  Ease of application mainly results from the ability to conduct studies in a 
hypothetical setting.  However, the hypothetical nature of the task (i.e., no transaction takes 
place) can affect the reliability of the estimations. As recent research has shown, 
hypothetical CA may result in overestimation of WTP estimates (Ding, Grewal, and 
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Liechty 2005).  Since subjects facing a hypothetical buying decision tend to behave 
differently than subjects in a real buying situation, it can lead to biased WTP estimates. 
 
Informational Effect and Cheap Talk Approach 
In the literature, it is common to see experiments where subjects are exposed to 
different informational treatments. For example, Paradiso and Trisorio (2001) found that 
letting the subject inspect the product in question reduced the ratio between hypothetical 
and real WTP from 3.5 to 2.7. Margolis and Shogren (2004), via an experimental protocol 
and the bootstrapping approach, estimated bid functions of the players, which helped to 
determine the auction winner, price, and payoff. They concluded that it is possible to get 
reliable results from inexperienced subjects when there are several repetitions. However, 
the subjects tended to avoid extreme values, which were interpreted as a lack of the 
bidder’s confidence in their understanding of the auction.  
Huffman et al. (2004) took a different approach with regards to information by 
examining its significance. In their study, after an EA in a lab, subjects chose the most 
reliable source for information on genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Using a 
multinomial model and the source of information as the dependent variable, results 
indicated that personal (education, age, and prior knowledge) and social (religious 
affiliation) characteristics would highly explain the most trusted source of information. 
Some specific findings were that income did not affect the trust placed in a specific source 
of information. Further, more educated people were found to rely more on third party 
information, while less educated persons relied more likely on governmental sources.  
Fox, Hayes and Shogren (2002) compared the effect of favorable and unfavorable 
information on the WTP for a pork sandwich irradiated to control Trichinella.  They found 
that subjects were more influenced by a negative description, even when the information is 
provided from a questionable source.  This fact could be explained by the consumers’ risk 
aversion or by the ambiguous interpretation of contradictory information.     
 Cheap talk can be thought of as a specific type of informational effect.  Cheap talk 
was first described in the game theory literature as a costless communication between 
subjects that can be effective in experimental coordination games (Charness and Grosskopf 
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2004). The effect of cheap talk in the ultimatum game1 was studied by Lusk and Hudson 
(2004a). They found that the more informed group behaved significantly different than a 
non-informed group by providing answers closer to the expected Nash equilibrium. In this 
sense, cheap talk could be used to “homogenize” the rationality and belief of participants, 
which is an assumption for obtaining a Nash equilibrium. This result is critical considering 
that a sophisticated experiment can easily fail if the researcher is not able to explain the 
directions of the experiment in a short time. Considering most subjects have no economic 
background, the reliability of complicated experiments may be in question.  This leads to 
another issue: how do you keep a participant’s attention if they know the incentive receive 
is independent of their effort?   
In the applied economics literature, Cummings and Taylor (1999) introduced cheap 
talk as the non-binding communication of actions before a hypothetical commitment. This 
communication specifically includes a discussion about the hypothetical bias problem.  
Their work is heavily referenced in field research.  For instance, List (2001), Brown, Ajzen 
and Hrubes (2003), Murphy, Stevens, and Weatherhead (2005), and Landry and List 
(2007) have all adapted that transcript to apply to different research conditions. Table 1 
summarizes the cheap talk literature. We did not include Lusk and Hudson’s (2004a) paper 
since it is game theory-related or Murphy et al. (2005) since it is a review of other authors’ 
work. 
 
                                                 
1 The ultimatum game features two parties that interact anonymously and only once.  The first party makes a 
proposal on how to divide a good and the second party could reject or accept this division. 
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Table 1. Selected Cheap Talk Papers 
Authors Year Task Content Words Setting Public Good
Loomis et al. 1996 CV Hypothetical vs. Non-Hypothetical Neutral 181 Lab No
Cummings and Taylor 1999 CV Hypothetical vs. Non-Hypothetical No neutral 920 and 941 Lab Yes
List 2001 Experimental Auction No neutral 941a Field No
Aadland and Caplan 2003 CV Hypothetical No neutral 49 Phone Yes
Brown et al. 2003 CV Hypothetical No neutral 941a Lab Yes
Lusk 2003 CV Hypothetical Neutral 522 Mail Yes
Carlsson et al. 2005 Hypothetical Choice Experiment No neutral 113 Mail No
Murphy et al. 2005 CV Hypothetical vs. Non-Hypothetical No neutral 941a Lab Yes
Aadland and Caplan 2006 CV Hypothetical Neutral 75 and 125 Phone Yes
Brummett et al. 2007 CV Hypothetical No neutral 128 Field No
Landry and List 2007 CV Hypothetical vs. Non-Hypothetical No neutral 941a Field Yes
Silva et al.b 2007 OE and CA Hypothetical vs. Non-Hypothetical Neutral 211 Field No
a The script was adapted from Cummings and Taylor (1999)
b This study, included for purposes of comparison.
Script
 
 
Overall, experimental studies show that cheap talk script is effective at reducing, or 
in some cases removing, hypothetical bias. To point, Murphy et al. (2005) conducted a 
meta-study with data from 28 WTP studies.  The authors found that the median ratio of 
hypothetical to actual value was 1.35 and that cheap talk effectively reduced the 
hypothetical bias. However, empirical evidence can be contradictory in some cases. After 
reviewing published work in this area, we synthesize the research on cheap talk into five 
basic findings that shape our research: First, the impact of cheap talk is affected by the 
length and the content of the script. Second, the payment level influences the cheap talk 
effect. Third, the subjects’ background can influence the cheap talk effect. Fourth, cheap 
talk studies have been conducted mainly in lab settings. Fifth, cheap talk studies have 
mainly utilized in CV methodologies. 
The impact of cheap talk is affected by the length and the content of the script: 
There is no consistency regarding the effect of cheap talk, especially for short scripts.  
Loomis et al. (1996) tested the effectiveness of reminding subjects about being honest in 
their evaluation.  In the previous literature, sometimes it has been classified as a cheap talk 
experiment.  The authors compared three CV formats, real, cheap talk, and hypothetical 
treatments.  However, they did not explicitly discuss hypothetical bias and its effect, which 
is one of the critical portions that Cummings and Taylor (1999) included in their original 
cheap talk script.  Loomis et al. (1996) found that the cheap talk script was not able to 
remove the hypothetical bias.  The cheap talk estimates were lower than hypothetical 
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estimates but were not significantly different. Brummett, Nayga and Wu (2007) did not 
find statistical significance using a short cheap talk paragraph, while Aadland and Caplan 
(2003) found that cheap talk can reduce the hypothetical bias, especially in some subjects’ 
profiles. In a different study, Aadland and Caplan (2006) argued that a neutral cheap talk 
can increase the hypothetical bias. Since their survey asked about a public program, the 
authors explained that subjects can be worried about the image of losing it, or alternatively, 
subjects can enhance the hypothetical nature of the task. In the end, they recommended 
using special caution with the use of words that can have different cognitive effects on the 
subjects. Using a long cheap talk script, Cummings and Taylor discussed the expected 
hypothetical bias and tested two alternative versions. In the first version, the authors 
included a discussion of the numerical results of a similar hypothetical task. In the second 
version, the same results were discussed without reference to numerical statistics.  The 
cheap talk scripts were successful in reducing hypothetical bias.  Both scripts made explicit 
references to the expected direction of the bias.          
The payment level influences the cheap talk effect: Brown, Ajzen and Hrubes 
(2003), using Cummings and Taylor’s script, found that a long cheap talk is successful just 
in a higher payment context.  The authors found that cheap talk reduced the hypothetical 
bias associated with payments of $5 and $8, but it was not significant at $3 and $1.  
Consistent with these findings, Murphy, Stevens, and Weatherhead (2005), using 
Cummings and Taylor’s script and a payment fee of $10, tested different contribution 
levels for a public good using real, cheap talk, and hypothetical treatments.  According to 
them, cheap talk did not conduct to a significant bias reduction when the subject was 
requested to contribute $4 and $6. However, the reduction was significantly different from 
zero in higher payment levels.   
The subjects’ background can influence the cheap talk effect: List (2001), using a 
long cheap talk, found that experienced card dealers did not change their WTP based on a 
cheap talk script.  However, inexperienced card dealers were affected by the paragraph.  
Consistent with these findings, Lusk (2003a), using a mailed survey about golden rice, 
argued that cheap talk is effective in reducing the WTP for unknowledgeable consumers. 
Aadland and Caplan (2003) found that a short script can reduce the hypothetical bias, 
which would depend on the type of subject under study. 
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Cheap talk studies have been conducted mainly in lab settings: Of the three studies 
we found that tested cheap talk in a field setting, two have been done recently. Landry and 
List (2007), adapting a Cummings and Taylor’s script, found that cheap talk was effective 
in eliminating hypothetical bias in CV and was not significantly different than the 
estimates in consequential tasks.2  In addition, Brummett, Nayga and Wu (2007), using 
irradiated mangos in Texas, did not find significant differences in the WTP estimates 
between groups, suggesting the absence of cheap talk effects.  However, it was not 
possible to measure the potential hypothetical bias since they did not have an actual 
product to compare.    
 Cheap talk studies have mainly utilized in CV methodologies:  According to 
Carlsson, Frykblom, and Lagerkvist (2005), there is very limited experience on the use of 
cheap talk to measure hypothetical bias in choice experiments.  In their analysis, they 
found seven out of ten WTP attributes were significantly lower for hypothetical choice 
tasks compared to cheap talk choice tasks. Murphy et al. (2005) found that choice 
experiments can significantly reduce the hypothetical bias since the choice format makes 
explicit the substitute effect and forces the subject to express their trade-off.  At the same 
time, the choice format allows room to express uncertainty, which needs to be converted 
later into a monetary value. In other words, the cut-off value to transform preferences into 
monetary values will be relevant.  
In summary, CA and EA are two highly used experimental approaches to compute 
WTP for novel products. In the application of these techniques, the study environment, 
nature of the pool of subjects and tasks play a key role in generating reliable results. The 
experimental design can involve a hypothetical or non-hypothetical task. In particular, the 
literature describes that hypothetical studies can be affected by hypothetical bias, which 
overestimates the true WTP.  We discussed some of the experimental work using cheap 
talk as an approach to reduce or eliminate the hypothetical bias. For the first time, a cheap 
talk study will allow us to compare its hypothetical bias reduction to incentive-aligned 
techniques for OE and CA formats in a retail setting. 
 
                                                 
2 In a consequential task, subjects have to believe that their responses have a direct impact on a public policy, 
so it is the best strategy to truly reveal their preferences.    
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, we discuss the experimental specifications of the study with respect 
to the topics that we highlighted before in the literature review section.  In addition, we 
explain the dataset structure and we propose a SUR approach and a random-effect Tobit 
model as complementary techniques to explain the data variability. In the next chapter, we 
explain the procedure that we followed with the data, and finally, the results are discussed 
and presented with some managerial implications. The nomenclature with respect to 
treatments and their respective tasks that are presented in this chapter are used frequently 
until the end of the document.   
 
Data 
We conducted the survey to each person that we could in the grocery store, so we 
explicitly did not want to preselect people because of any reason.  However, at the time of 
analyzing the data, we did not include them since they were not sensitive to the task 
information and we did not want to underestimate the true WTP values based on people 
that are not in the market. We have a total of 555 completed surveys in our study.  We 
removed 53 subjects from the data who rejected the product (32 subjects in CA and 21 
subjects in OE tasks) and 3 subjects who provided of inconsistent answers. In our dataset, 
we decided to not include people who initially rejected the product (fresh-cut grapefruit).  
Specifically, some subjects rejected the product because of some external reasons, such as 
medical reasons.  In the end, we analyzed 499 subjects distributed in eight treatments: (1) 
non-hypothetical OE elicitation, (2) non-hypothetical BDM OE elicitation, (3) hypothetical 
OE elicitation, (4) cheap talk OE elicitation, (5) non-hypothetical CA, (6) non-hypothetical 
BDM CA, (7) hypothetical CA, and (8) cheap talk CA (see Table 2).  In the rest of the 
document, each group is called a treatment and is identified with its respective number 
from 1 to 8.   
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Table 2. Experimental Treatments 
Treatment Name Task Elicited Product n
Open-Ended Elicitation
1 Non-Hypothetical Subject writes down his WTP for each of the four 
products, a product is randomly chosen until he 
gets one and pays his state price.
100% 71
2 Non-Hypothetical BDM Subject writes down his WTP for each product, a 
product randomly chosen and if he win he will pay 
his state price if it is higher than the market price.
25% 41
3 Hypothetical Subject writes down his WTP for each product, he 
does not get any product nor does he pays 
anything.
0% 59
4 Cheap Talk After reading a paragraph, subject writes down his 
WTP for each product, he does not get any product 
nor does he pays anything.
0% 73
Conjoint Analysis
5 Non-Hypothetical Subject rates twelve pictures, a product is 
randomly chosen until he gets one and pays the 
price of the picture for that particular product.
100% 73
6 Non-Hypothetical BDM Subject rates twelve pictures, a product randomly 
chosen and if he win he will pay the price of the 
picture for that particular product if it is higher 
than the market price.
25% 50
7 Hypothetical Subject rates twelve pictures, he does not get any 
product nor does he pays anything.  This is known 
as the traditional conjoint analysis.
0% 73
8 Cheap Talk After reading a paragraph, subject rates twelve 
pictures.  He does not get any product nor does he 
pays anything.
0% 59
 
 
Study Specifications 
In February 2007, we conducted a field experiment utilizing both CA and OE 
elicitation mechanisms, at selected grocery stores in Texas. We decided to conduct a field 
experiment after considering the advantages identified by Lusk and Hudson (2004b).  For 
example, subjects are in a more familiar environment, lower compensatory fees are 
necessary, there is a natural availability of complementary and supplementary goods, and 
we can better target the population of interest. Particularly, in our case, a field experiment 
allowed us to get a wide range of demographic characteristics, minimize participation fees, 
and test cheap talk scripts in a setting close to a real purchase situation. In this sense, the 
recruited subjects were adult shoppers (at least 18 years old), who were intercepted while 
exiting the store and asked to participate in the study.  None could participate more than 
once in the protocol.  The study was designed to last no longer than ten minutes to reduce 
respondent fatigue.   
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Experiment instructions were tested in a focus group using 15 graduate students in 
the Department of Agricultural Economics at Texas A&M University. Using the focus 
group information, a pretest in a grocery store was conducted.  The pretest and focus group 
were useful to test the wording and length of the instructions, as a practice for the 
recruiters, and to get a range of values to be used in the CA treatments; this is similar to the 
procedure followed by Campbell et al. (2006).  Following Ortmann’s (2005) 
recommendations, we developed comprehensive scripts to avoid irregularities between 
treatments for our experimental study, which can be reviewed in the Appendices in 
addition to the demographic and consumption questionnaires.  The scripts indentified the 
optimal strategy: to bid your true WTP.  The eight treatments utilized similar 
questionnaires.  The only difference was that the cheap talk treatments (treatments four and 
eight) included two additional questions asking specifically about the effect of the cheap 
talk paragraph.   
With regard to endowments, each subject received four dollars as a monetary 
payment at the end of the study (in both the hypothetical and non-hypothetical treatments).  
We do not expect a significant endowment effect in the WTP estimates, since this amount 
is equivalent to the highest markup price (i.e., highest CA price level) for their 
participation.  This value was chosen to minimize the endowment effect, which is more 
significant when higher payments are used. Further, it allowed us to engage and commit 
subjects to the study.  For those respondents that purchased a product, the purchase price 
was deducted from the initial four dollars. If a subject wanted to spend more than the 
participation fee, they would need to pay the difference by cash or check to the researcher.  
We decided to use a single round elicitation mechanism. Corrigan and Rousu 
(2006b) showed experimental evidence that, in repeated trials, posted prices have a 
significant effect on the bids of the following rounds.  In other words, a subject’s bid 
would be affected by the posted price, which is not a desirable influence on our study.  We 
are not looking for converging values; rather, we want to identify the characteristics of 
respondents with different WTP. 
For our study, we used a generic, short, and neutral script.  Our script was inspired 
by the one utilized by Cumming and Taylor (1999); however, we decided to modify it for 
our purposes.  First, we made it generic and did not make any reference to the elicited 
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product.  Second, we made it shorter in order to be more applicable in a field experiment. 
Third, our wording took into account the recommendations expressed by Aadland and 
Caplan (2006).  We did not use words such as “overstate” or “higher” to avoid biasing the 
responses to a certain side.  Instead, we phrased statements such as “people tend to act 
differently when they face a hypothetical situation.”  In addition, we did not use words that 
could create strong visual reference in the subject. For instance, words that recreate images 
of natural disasters or diseases may generate an overreaction in the subjects. In summary, 
our cheap talk script is generic with respect to the elicited good, short enough to be applied 
in a retail or phone study, and neutral with respect to the direction of the hypothetical bias. 
We used value-added grapefruit products with attributes consisting of type of cut 
(segmented or cubed) and preservatives (with or without) in our WTP experiments. The 
attributes of interest (i.e., segment/cube and with/without preservatives) were identified 
during our pre-tests as the most important attributes that consumers consider in purchasing 
value-added grapefruit products. According to Hair (2006), attributes that are most 
important in a consumer’s buying decision should be used in the product profiles.  
However, attributes should be chosen to minimize collinearity. This method of choosing a 
markup for a yet-to-be-marketed citrus product was utilized by Campbell et al. (2006). In 
addition to these attributes, the CA experiments also involved a price attribute ($0.50, 
$2.50, or $4.00 per half-pound).  Our OE elicitation mechanism did not specify price since 
respondents were required to give their own WTP.   
Each product was presented in an 8” by 10” picture, which were all taken in the 
same light conditions.  OE elicitation and CA treatments involved four and twelve pictures, 
respectively, to consider all the possible combinations.  CA required a larger number of 
pictures since it included three levels of prices, as opposed to the OE elicitation treatments.  
The picture order, for OE elicitation and CA, were randomized over the study to minimize 
any order effect.  Trying to minimize undesirable patterns, we conducted the survey in 
three grocery stores, combining time of the day, days of the week, and treatments.   
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Experimental Design 
Type of Subject:  Retail walk-in people over 18 years old in select grocery store in 
Texas  
Elicited Product:  Half-pound of value-added grapefruit product.   
Type of Products:  Cubes with preservatives 
   Cubes without preservatives 
   Segments with preservatives 
   Segments without preservatives 
Participation Fee:  $4 in cash at the end 
 
Steps per Treatment 
Open-Ended Elicitation Mechanism (treatment 1 to treatment 4)   
Pictures Sets:   Four pictures for OE treatments 
Task:    Write down WTP for each picture for OE treatments 
 
Treatment 1: Non-hypothetical  
Step 1: Subject goes over the welcome questionnaire (demographic), which can be 
found in the Appendix 1, for all treatments. 
Step 2: Subject checks the four pictures and writes down his WTP for each one 
knowing that he has to purchase one of the products.  Subject is informed 
that a binding product will be randomly picked. 
Step 3: Randomly, the interviewer selects a binding product. 
Step 4: Subject gets the binding product, pays the bid price, and gets the remaining 
cash up to $4.  Consequently, each subject takes a product home and pays 
his initially stated WTP.   
Step 5: Subject goes over the exit questionnaire (consumption), which can be found 
in the Appendix.  The same exit questionnaire is used in all treatments. 
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Treatment 2: Non-Hypothetical BDM 
Step 1: Subject goes over the welcome questionnaire (demographic). 
Step 2: Subject checks the four pictures and writes down his WTP for each one. 
Subject is informed that a binding product will be picked and he will need 
to buy it.  We randomly selected one product from four possible products, 
which gives them a chance of 25% to take a product home if the stated price 
was equal or higher than the market price.   
Step 3: Randomly, the interviewer selects a binding product and shows the market 
price, which was previews randomly predetermined.  However, the subject 
did not know the market price until he expressed his WTP for all products.   
Step 4: The subject has to purchase the randomly selected product if their stated 
price was equal to or higher than the market price. He will have to pay the 
market price and will get the remaining cash up to $4.  If he does not get the 
product, he will get the full $4. 
Step 5: Subject goes over the exit questionnaire (consumption). 
 
Treatment 3: Hypothetical Open-Ended 
Step 1: Subject goes over the welcome questionnaire (demographic). 
Step 2: Subject checks the four pictures and writes down his WTP for each one. 
Step 3: There is no binding product; each subject gets the full $4 and no product. 
Step 4: Subject goes over the exit questionnaire (consumption). 
 
Treatment 4: Cheap talk Open-Ended 
Step 1: Subject goes over the welcome questionnaire (demographic). 
Step 2: Subject reads the cheap talk paragraph, which can be found in the 
Appendix. 
Step 3: Subject checks the four pictures and writes down his WTP for each one. 
Step 4: There is no binding product; each subject gets the full $4 and no product. 
Step 5: Subject goes over the exit questionnaire (consumption). 
 
 
 
26 
 
Conjoint Analysis Treatments (treatment 5 to treatment 8)  
Picture Sets:  Twelve pictures for CA treatments, each picture had a unique 
combination of attributes and a pre-determined price.  The set of 
twelve pictures include all the possible combinations of attributes 
that make an orthogonal design. In the empirical model section, we 
describe in detail the CA task and the transformation from rating 
values to monetary WTP estimates, which was used by Voelckner 
(2006).       
Task:  Rate each picture for CA treatments. A rating of one means that the 
subject will definitely not purchase the product, a rating of four that 
they may or may not and a rating of seven that they would definitely 
purchase the product.   
 
Treatment 5: Non-hypothetical  
Step 1: Subject goes over the welcome questionnaire (demographic). 
Step 2: Subject checks the twelve pictures and rates them from one to seven.   
Step 3: Randomly, the interviewer selects three binding products.  
Step 4: If one of the binding products were rated four or higher, the subject will get 
a binding product, pays the price in the picture, and gets the remaining cash 
up to $4.  If the subject has more than one binding product rated four or 
higher, we randomly pick one.  
Step 5: Subject goes over the exit questionnaire (consumption). 
 
Treatment 6: Non-Hypothetical BDM 
Step 1: Subject goes over the welcome questionnaire (demographic). 
Step 2: Subject checks the twelve pictures and rates them from one to seven. 
Step 3: Randomly, the interviewer selects a binding product and a market price. If 
his rating is less than four, then another product was randomly drawn.  This 
procedure continued until a transaction occurred or three products had been 
drawn randomly.  Up to three products were chosen to maintain the same 
chance of “winning” as in treatment 2 (non-hypothetical BDM OE 
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elicitation), given that the subject had a favorable rating for the product.  In 
other words, in both non-hypothetical BDM treatments, a subject has a 25% 
chance to take the product home if he has a real interest in the product.   
Step 4: If one of the binding products were rated four or higher and the picture 
price is equal or higher than the market price, the subject will get a binding 
product, pays the market price, and gets the remaining cash up to $4. 
Step 5: Subject goes over the exit questionnaire (consumption). 
 
Based on the incentive-aligned literature, this can be thought of as a modified 
version of the work done by Ding, Grewal, and Liechty (2005) and Voelckner (2006).  We 
implement a double random procedure; since we randomly selected a product and the 
market price was determined randomly (non-hypothetical BDM elicitation).  Using this 
mechanism, we minimize the product requirement, while keeping the incentive 
compatibility properties of the elicitation mechanism intact.     
 
Treatment 7: Hypothetical 
Step 1: Subject goes over the welcome questionnaire (demographic). 
Step 2: Subject checks the twelve pictures and rates them from one to seven. 
Step 3: There is not binding product, each subject gets the full $4 and no product. 
Step 4: Subject goes over the exit questionnaire (consumption). 
 
Treatment 8: Cheap talk  
Step 1: Subject goes over the welcome questionnaire (demographic). 
Step 2: Subject reads the cheap talk paragraph, which can be found in the 
Appendix. 
Step 3: Subject checks the twelve pictures and rates them from one to seven. 
Step 4: There is not a binding product, so each subject gets the full $4 and no 
product. 
Step 5: Subject goes over the exit questionnaire (consumption). 
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Empirical Model 
After conducting the study either through the OE elicitation or CA format, the next 
critical step is the calculation and comparison of WTP estimates. Calculation of the WTP 
of a product, for both the hypothetical and non-hypothetical auction experiments, involved 
running a regression to test the significance of both treatment effects and other explanatory 
variables, such as demographic characteristics.  With regards to hypothetical and non-
hypothetical CA, when a rating scale was used, the ratings were regressed on the product 
profiles to obtain part-worth estimates.  Next, a transformation is needed to move from 
utility space to a monetary price space.  Voelckner’s (2006) transformation utilizes a limit-
card to make the conversion from utility to price, and is briefly described below.  First, 
part-worths are estimated for each attribute level and for each respondent using ordinary 
least squares. Second, the utility is calculated for each product using all part-worths except 
those associated with price.  Third, the utility for those products the respondent is willing 
to buy and the minimum or limit utility are calculated.  Fourth, the price that equates the 
limit utility with the utility value in step two is then the monetary WTP.   
After obtaining all the WTP for every treatment, we propose two models to analyze 
the data: a SUR system and a random-effect Tobit model. In the remaining part of this 
section, we justify the use of these models based on the data structure.  
 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model 
 It is more flexible to assume that the variables that explain the bid level can differ 
by product; in addition, we expected to find correlation between the error term of each 
equation.  In this sense, the SUR approach allows for different coefficient vectors and 
captures efficiency from the correlation between error terms. The model can be represented 
by  
 
,iiii XWTP εβ +=  
 
where the subscript “i” identifies the product (1 to 4).  Greene (2003) explains that 
generalized least squares estimation for the SUR model allows a greater gain of efficiency 
when the equations are related, have a different set of explanatory variables, and when the 
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dataset is different for each equation.  In our case, we run a simple linear regression per 
product to test for heteroskedasticity and run a Ramsey test3 to avoid omitted variables. 
After testing each equation, we generate a system of four equations (one per product) to be 
estimated using a SUR approach and compute the correlation matrix of the error terms.      
   
Random-Effect Tobit Model 
As discussed by Greene (2003), there are several ways to analyze panel data, 
namely pooled data, fixed-effect, and random-effect models.  For a detailed discussion of 
each approach, we recommend chapter 13, p. 283 in Greene (2003).  In summary, the key 
distinction between approaches depends on the assumption of variability between subjects.  
Pooled regression assumes no variability across subjects, a fixed-effect model assumes a 
constant variability, and a random-effect model considers that the subject’s variability 
changes over time (or over product in our case).  Considering our dataset structure, pooled 
regression is too restrictive since we have a wide range of demographic characteristics that 
would make it difficult to assume a homogeneous group.  Initially, a fixed-effect model 
seems appealing, however, it too is data-demanding since it requires a dummy variable per 
subject and we have four observations per subject. In general, fixed-effect models are 
recommended when there are few subjects and many observations per subject.  Finally, 
with random-effect models, the individual differences are treated as random and assume no 
correlation between explanatory variables and the disturbance term.   
We pooled the cross-sectional data by type of product.  The panel structure allows 
capturing product-series and cross-sectional structure of the data.  A random-effect single 
limit (censored at 0) Tobit model was used to assess both attribute and treatment effects on 
WTP.  The model has a panel-like structure of our data when all treatments were merged 
together (sequence of responses). The dependent variable was the WTP level and the 
explanatory variables were the demographic and attitudinal characteristics.  We include a 
set of dummy variables to take into account the differences per treatment (a subset per 
elicitation mechanism, with the first treatment as the base) and per product (1 to 4, product 
1 the base). We consider a censored model, since participants were explicitly told that they 
                                                 
3 The Ramsey test is used to check if a non-linear combination of the current explanatory variables has any 
explanatory power.  If that is the case, it is taken as evidence of a misspecified model.   
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could assess a WTP of zero dollars if they did not want the product.  At the same time, this 
technique is able to measure the effect of observable and non-observable influences.  The 
last dummy variable explains the cross-sectional heterogeneity that can be expected since 
we are working with walk-in people.  The composite error is assumed to be normally 
distributed.  Consequently, the proposed model considers cross-sectional heterogeneity and 
censored data and can be described as:   
 
iititit uvxWTP ++= 'α , 
 
where subscript “i” identifies the subject and “t” the product (1 to 4), WTP can take zero or 
positive values, Xit is a vector of independent variables, “u” is the disturbance term per 
subject or cross section, and v is the overall disturbance term.  Taking advantage of the 
panel structure, we are able to gain degrees of freedom and compare the treatments at the 
same time independently of the underlying demographic differences of the samples.   
With respect to past research, Carlsson, Frykblom, and Lagerkvist (2005) used a 
random-effect logit model to measure the difference between treatments with and without 
cheap talk.   Lusk and Fox (2003) used a random-effect Tobit model to compare non-
hypothetical and hypothetical treatments in lab and field settings.  Carlsson and Martinsson 
(2007), using a CV survey dataset and a random-effect Tobit model, estimated WTP to 
avoid power outages in Switzerland.   
In the linear case, Hausman’s test can be used to justify the decision between a 
fixed and a random-effect model. For the Tobit model, we found no robust evidence of the 
fixed-effect models. Some relevant work in this area has been done by Honore (1992). 
We estimate rho ( ), the panel unit variance ( ), and overall disturbance 
variance ( ), 
ρ 2vσ
2
eσ
,22
2
ve
v
i σσ
σρ +=  
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rho is interpreted as percent contribution of the total variance of the panel level.  So, a zero 
rho means that the panel and pooled estimator are the same.   
     In summary, we collected a dataset composed of 499 subjects distributed in eight 
treatments.  Each subject expressed their WTP for four products.  Considering the data 
structure, we proposed two complementary techniques to study the data:  The SUR 
approach and random-effect Tobit model.  In the next chapter, we formally run diagnostic 
tests to check the models and explain the results.  Finally, in the last chapter, we discuss 
the managerial implications of the findings.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
As presented in Chapter III, the dataset is composed of 499 subjects and organized 
into eight treatments.  In the OE treatments, each subject expressed his WTP for each of 
four product profiles.  In the CA treatments, each subject rated twelve product profiles that 
mixed both attribute and prices, which were subsequently to estimate the WTP.  In this 
chapter, we start by comparing unconditional means and median per treatment.  Then, we 
analyze the data using a SUR approach and a random-effect Tobit model.  Finally, we 
focus on the cheap talk treatments and check the hypothetical bias reduction.   
Initially, we cleaned the data for missing observations or other errors, and then we 
created a set of indicator (dummy) variables for the categorical answers. The descriptive 
statistics for continuous and categorical variables in the models are presented in Table 3.  
The original questionnaires are located in Appendix A. The independent variables can be 
classified as demographic or consumption variables, and are either categorical or 
continuous in nature.  Only treatments 4 and 8 (cheap talk treatments) include two follow-
up questions that are directly related to the cheap talk script. The dependent variables are 
continuous and correspond to the WTP per product. These values are distributed from zero 
to six dollars and censored at zero. Comparing the unconditional mean per product, we 
find that subjects are willing to pay $1.47 per half pound for cubes without preservatives 
and $1.06 for the same product form with preservatives. In addition, consumers are willing 
to pay $1.61 for segmented fruit without preservatives and $1.15 for segments with 
preservatives. Consequently, the non preservative attribute was valued around $0.43, while 
the segments were valued around $0.12 more than cubes. However, we need a conditional 
analysis that takes into account the demographic and consumption factors and treatment 
information. With respect to the econometric software package, we mainly used Stata 9.2 
to clean and analyze the dataset.  SAS was used for the calculation of the CA part-worth 
estimation.  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Independent Variables
Demographics
Type of Variable Mean1 SD Median Min Max n
Gender
Male Indicator 0.4 0.5 0 0 1 499
Female Indicator 0.6 0.5 1 0 1 499
Marital Status
Single Indicator 0.5 0.5 1 0 1 499
Married Indicator 0.4 0.5 0 0 1 499
Other Indicator 0.1 0.2 0 0 1 499
Income
Less than $19,999 Indicator 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 495
$20,000 - $39,999 Indicator 0.2 0.4 0 0 1 495
$40,000 - $59,999 Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 495
$60,000 - $79,999 Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 495
$80,000 - $99,999 Indicator 0.1 0.2 0 0 1 495
$100,000 and more Indicator 0.1 0.2 0 0 1 495
Race or ethnic group
White Indicator 0.6 0.5 1 0 1 498
Hispanic Indicator 0.2 0.4 0 0 1 498
African-American Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 498
Asian Indicator 0.1 0.2 0 0 1 498
Other Indicator 0.03 0.2 0 0 1 498
Age (years) Continuous 34.2 15.3 27 18 92 498
People at home under 14 years (number) Continuous 0.5 0.9 0 0 6 499
People at home between 15-25 years (number) Continuous 1.3 1.4 1 0 6 499
People at home between 26-50 years (number) Continuous 0.7 0.9 0 0 3 499
People at home older than 50 years (number) Continuous 0.4 0.7 0 0 4 499
Education (years) Continuous 14.5 2.6 14 4 25 499
Education less than 12 years Indicator 0.04 0.2 0 0 1 499
Education 12 years (graduated from high school) Indicator 0.3 0.4 0 0 1 499
Education between 12 and 16 years Indicator 0.3 0.5 0 0 1 499
Education 16 years (graduated from college) Indicator 0.2 0.4 0 0 1 499
Education more than 16 years Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 499
Consumption
Primary household shopper
Yes Indicator 0.8 0.4 1 0 1 493
No Indicator 0.2 0.4 0 0 1 493
State/Emotion
Hungry Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 498
Thirsty Indicator 0.3 0.5 0 0 1 498
Both Indicator 0.2 0.4 0 0 1 498
Neither Indicator 0.3 0.5 0 0 1 498  
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Table 3. Continued 
Mean SD Median Min Max n
Consume at least once a month
Yes Indicator 0.5 0.5 1 0 1 499
No, because of taste Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 499
No, because of not sweet enough Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 499
No, because of medication Indicator 0.03 0.2 0 0 1 499
No, because of expensiveness Indicator 0.02 0.1 0 0 1 499
No, because of difficultness to eat Indicator 0.02 0.1 0 0 1 499
No, because of allergies Indicator 0.01 0.1 0 0 1 499
No, because of a combination of above Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 499
No, because of other reasons Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 499
Purchase location
Grocery store Indicator 0.8 0.4 1 0 1 493
Farmers market Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 493
Roadside stand Indicator 0.002 0.0 0 0 1 493
A combination of above Indicator 0.04 0.2 0 0 1 493
Other Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 493
Purchase for special occasion
Yes Indicator 0.2 0.4 0 0 1 497
No Indicator 0.8 0.4 1 0 1 497
Origin preferences
Texas Indicator 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 497
Does not matter Indicator 0.4 0.5 0 0 1 497
Other US state Indicator 0.04 0.2 0 0 1 497
Other Indicator 0.1 0.2 0 0 1 497
Exposure to the raw product
Yes Indicator 0.7 0.4 1 0 1 498
No Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 498
Do not know Indicator 0.2 0.4 0 0 1 498
Valley (South Texas) origin
Yes Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 499
No Indicator 0.9 0.3 1 0 1 499
Small town origin
Yes Indicator 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 499
No Indicator 0.9 0.3 1 0 1 499
1.0
Monthly fresh product purchase (times) Continuous 1.4 1.7 1 0 14 482
Purchased quantity (pound) Continuous 2.1 2.9 1 0 25 493
Rating of product interest (units) Continuous 5.6 2.6 6 1 10 322
Rating of task complexity (units) Continuous 2.7 2.4 1 1 10 478
Cheap Talk Questions (just for groups four and eight)
Rating of cheap talk impact on WTP (units) Continuous 4.1 2.8 4 1 10 129
Rating of cheap talk paragraph complexity (units) Continuous 2.1 1.9 1 1 10 131
Dependent Variables 
WTP Product 1 ($) Continuous 1.5 1.1 1.3 0 5.3 499
WTP Product 2 ($) Continuous 1.1 1.0 0.9 0 6.0 499
WTP Product 3 ($) Continuous 1.6 1.2 1.5 0 5.2 499
WTP Product 4 ($) Continuous 1.2 1.0 1.0 0 5.7 499
1 Most of the variables are indicators. For instance, in the case of gender, the variable “male” has a value of 
one if the subject is a male and “zero” if otherwise.  In the dataset, 40% of the subjects are men and 60% 
are women. When the variable is continuous, the units are indicated between parentheses. For further 
references, the original questionnaires can be found in Appendix A.  
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Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) checked the internal consistency of a choice 
experimental, and later on, the external consistency to test for the hypothetical bias.  
Following the same idea, we check the internal consistency, comparing distributions using 
a non-parametric approach, and checking the degree of difficulty of the task.  After this, we 
will check the external consistency using the SUR approach and random-effect Tobit 
models to test for the hypothetical bias. 
 
Internal Consistency 
 Initially, we checked the internal consistency testing for the differences in the WTP 
distribution per treatment.  Table 4 presents the means per treatment and per product, their 
respective standard deviations, and proportion of zero values.  Overall, we found that 16% 
of the WTP values were zero.  Comparing the treatments, consistent with our expectations, 
the hypothetical treatments had the lowest percent of zeros compared with the OE and CA 
treatments with 4% and 19%, respectively.   
Comparing the ratio of hypothetical/non-hypothetical means, Murphy et al. (2005) 
had a ratio of 1.35 in a meta-analysis and Lusk and Schroeder (2004), using a choice 
experiment found a mean ratio of 1.2. In our study, the hypothetical/non-hypothetical mean 
ratio is 1.26 for OE and 1.18 for CA treatments. Compared with the non-hypothetical 
BDM, the mean ratio goes to 1.20 for OE and 1.22 for CA.  Finally, when we use cheap 
talk instead of non-hypothetical, the mean ratio is 1.27 for OE and 1.35 for CA. Now, 
comparing elicitation mechanisms, the mean ratio of hypothetical OE/hypothetical CA is 
1.26.  The mean ratio between non-hypothetical treatments is 1.18, the mean ratio between 
non-hypothetical BDM treatments is 1.28, and the mean ratio between cheap talk 
treatments is 1.35.   
In Table 5, we computed the median, maximum, and minimum value per treatment 
and per product.  The WTP values ranged from $0 to $6.  However, more formal statistical 
methods are needed in order to test for the possible distributional differences.  
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Table 4. Mean per Treatment and Product 
Treatment Product 1 Product 2 Product 3 Product 4
1 Mean 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.2
SD 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0
Proportion of zeros 4% 17% 6% 21%
2 Mean 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.3
SD 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.9
Proportion of zeros 2% 7% 0% 5%
3 Mean 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.7
SD 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9
Proportion of zeros 3% 8% 0% 5%
4 Mean 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.3
SD 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Proportion of zeros 3% 10% 1% 10%
5 Mean 1.4 0.8 1.6 1.0
SD 1.1 0.8 1.2 0.9
Proportion of zeros 21% 32% 15% 26%
6 Mean 1.4 0.7 1.5 0.8
SD 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.1
Proportion of zeros 16% 40% 16% 32%
7 Mean 1.5 0.8 2.0 1.2
SD 1.2 0.8 1.4 1.0
Proportion of zeros 12% 32% 11% 22%
8 Mean 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.9
SD 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.0
Proportion of zeros 31% 36% 27% 37%  
 
Table 5. Median per Treatment and Product 
Treatment Product 1 Product 2 Product 3 Product 4
1 Median 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0
Max 4.5 6.0 4.0 4.0
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 Median 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.0
Max 4.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
Min 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
3 Median 2.0 1.5 1.8 1.5
Max 4.0 3.5 5.0 5.0
Min 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
4 Median 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.1
Max 5.0 4.0 5.0 4.0
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 Median 1.4 0.5 1.5 0.8
Max 3.6 3.1 4.3 3.5
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 Median 1.2 0.6 1.4 0.5
Max 4.4 3.0 4.3 5.7
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7 Median 1.3 0.7 1.9 1.1
Max 4.3 3.3 4.9 3.9
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8 Median 1.1 0.5 0.8 0.4
Max 5.3 3.7 5.2 3.5
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
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Considering that 16% of the WTP bids are zero values, and we are aware that WTP 
has a censored distribution, we did not assume normality and decided to use a non-
parametric test. Consequently, we ran a series of two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
for equality of distribution functions.  We tested all of the possible pair combinations for 
the eight treatments. Table 6 presents all of the pair combinations that are significantly 
different.  It is possible to distinguish three overall trends.  First, hypothetical treatments 
are significantly different from the other treatments.  Second, the OE non-hypothetical 
treatment and cheap talk OE treatment are not significantly different from each other but 
are significantly different from the CA.  Third, the non-hypothetical CA treatment and 
cheap talk CA treatment are not significantly different from each other but are significantly 
different from the OE treatments. This analysis checks for the differences between WTP 
value distributions; however, it is not possible to infer the sign or magnitude from these 
differences.  Later in the chapter, we propose a random-effect Tobit model and SUR 
approach to identify and determine the magnitude of the differences.   
 
Table 6. Mean Differences between Treatments 
Treatment Level of Significance Product 1 Product 2 Product 3 Product 4
1 Difference at 5% 3,8 3,5,6,7,8 3,7,8 3,6,8
Difference at 10% 3,5,8 3,5,6,7,8 3,7,8 3,6,8
Difference at 20% 3,4,5,8 3,5,6,7,8 3,7,8 3,6,8
2 Difference at 5% 5,8 3,5,6,7,8 7,8 3,5,6,8
Difference at 10% 5,8 3,5,6,7,8 3,7,8 3,5,6,8
Difference at 20% 3,5,6,8 3,5,6,7,8 3,5,7,8 3,5,6,8
3 Difference at 5% 1,4,5,6,7,8 1,2,4,5,6,7,8 1,5,6,8 1,2,4,5,6,7,8
Difference at 10% 1,4,5,6,7,8 1,2,4,5,6,7,8 1,2,4,5,6,7,8 1,2,4,5,6,7,8
Difference at 20% 1,2,4,5,6,7,8 1,2,4,5,6,7,8 1,2,4,5,6,7,8 1,2,4,5,6,7,8
4 Difference at 5% 3,5,8 3,5,6,7,8 5,7,8 3,5,6,8
Difference at 10% 3,5,6,8 3,5,6,7,8 3,5,7,8 3,5,6,8
Difference at 20% 1,3,5,6,8 3,5,6,7,8 3,5,7,8 3,5,6,8
5 Difference at 5% 2,3,4 1,2,3,4 3,4 2,3,4
Difference at 10% 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 3,4 2,3,4
Difference at 20% 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 2,3,4,7,8 2,3,4
6 Difference at 5% 3 1,2,3,4 3 1,2,3,4,7
Difference at 10% 3,4 1,2,3,4 3,7 1,2,3,4,7
Difference at 20% 2,3,4 1,2,3,4 3,7 1,2,3,4,7
7 Difference at 5% 3 1,2,3,4 1,2,4,8 3,6,8
Difference at 10% 3,8 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4,6,8 3,6,8
Difference at 20% 3,8 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4,5,6,8 3,6,8
8 Difference at 5% 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4,7 1,2,3,4,7
Difference at 10% 1,2,3,4,7 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4,7 1,2,3,4,7
Difference at 20% 1,2,3,4,7 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4,5,7 1,2,3,4,7  
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As an additional means to check the internal validity, we included a question 
asking each respondent to rate the degree of complexity of the experiments (Table 7). The 
idea behind this question was to better understand the complexity of the treatment for each 
subject and to determine whether the subject actually behaved as expected in a 
hypothetical task compared to a non-hypothetical task. As anticipated, the hypothetical 
treatments had a lower complexity index score than the non-hypothetical treatments. The 
hypothetical treatments required little training to complete their task, while the non-
hypothetical treatments required more respondent effort to understand the experiment.  In 
addition, non-hypothetical treatments involved some type of randomization that can be a 
source of misunderstanding for some people, especially subjects with no training in 
economics.  Further analysis revealed that the hypothetical CA (the most popular 
approach) had the lowest complexity score, while non-hypothetical CA treatments had the 
highest score.  In addition, the random-effect estimations show that the complexity 
variable was not significantly different from zero. Considering the level of complexity 
expressed by the subjects overall is 2.72 out of 10 (considering the eight treatments), and 
since the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant from zero, we do not believe 
that the complexity of the treatments played a significant role in their WTP estimates or in 
explaining the WTP variation.  In addition, we were able to verify that subjects rated the 
complexity task as expected. 
 
Table 7. Level of Complexity of the Task 
Complexity
 Level
1 2.88
2 2.92
3 2.64
4 2.15
Average Open Ended 2.60
5 3.13
6 3.07
7 2.26
8 3.26
Average Conjoint 2.88
Total Average 2.72
Note: The subject classifies the task from 1 (very easy) to 10 (very hard)
Treatment
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Consequently, to test internal validity, we compared the WTP unconditional means 
using a non-parametric approach.  As predicted, we found that hypothetical treatments are 
significantly different and have a higher percent of zero values.  The non-hypothetical 
approaches were not significantly different from the OE and CA groups.  Finally, the 
subjects rated the complexity of the hypothetical tasks lower than non-hypothetical tasks. 
Based on these arguments, further evaluation of the data is justified.   
In the next section, we estimate the sign and magnitude of the differences between 
treatments.  We analyze the conditional behavior of the dataset using the SUR approach 
and random-effect Tobit model.  Considering the findings up until this point, we expect to 
find significant differences between treatment indicator variables and also between 
hypothetical and non-hypothetical treatments.  However, it remains to be seen whether 
there will be a significant difference between non-hypothetical and hypothetical WTP 
estimations. 
 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression  
 After testing for internal validity, we performed several diagnostic tests.  First, we 
checked the variance inflation factor, condition index, and variance decomposition for 
collinearity. Second, we ran an ordinary least square (OLS) regression per product in order 
to recover the residuals. By regressing the residuals against the continuous explanatory 
variables, we were able to check for heteroskedasticity using an F-test. Results indicate 
that the F-test was not significantly different from zero, indicating homoskedastic error 
terms.  In addition, we used Ramsey’s test to evaluate model specification. Given one 
equation per product, we have a system of four equations that we solve using the SUR 
technique, assuming correlated error terms.  We expect to find significant correlation in the 
error terms since each subject needed to express his WTP for four similar products.   
In Tables 9 and 10, we present two SUR systems. In Table 9, we present a system 
for the OE treatments (using treatments 1 to 4).  In Table 10, we present a system for the 
CA treatments (using treatments 5 to 8).  In both cases, we used the first treatment (non-
hypothetical) as the base to compare with non-hypothetical DBM, hypothetical, and cheap 
talk treatments.  By taking advantage of a systems approach, we are able to determine 
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whether cheap talk treatments offer a significant hypothetical bias reduction compared to 
the non-hypothetical treatment of OE and CA WTP estimates.   
From the empirical results, we see some common trends associated with the OE 
and CA systems.  First, hypothetical treatments generated significantly higher estimates 
than non-hypothetical treatments.  Second, non-hypothetical treatments are not 
significantly different from cheap talk treatments. Third, in general there are no clear 
demographic and consumption patterns than can be used to significantly explain WTP.  
Even considering that the products are very similar, there is no common vector of 
significant explanatory variables for the four products.  Fourth, there is not a statistical 
difference in the cheap talk effect across products. In the next section, we discuss these 
results with the random-effect Tobit to present a scenario complementing both. 
Table 8 shows the residual correlation matrix for OE and CA treatments. As 
expected, the residuals are highly correlated, which is one of the assumptions that we made 
in using the SUR approach.   
 
Table 8. Residual Correlation Matrix for SUR Model 
Open-Ended Treatments (1 to 4)
Product 1 Product 2 Product 3 Product 4
Product 1 1
Product 2 0.70 1
Product 3 0.74 0.54
Product 4 0.59 0.78 0.63 1
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: Chi-Squared(6) = 647.404, Pr = 0.00
Conjoint Analysis Treatments (5 to 8)
Product 1 Product 2 Product 3 Product 4
Product 1 1
Product 2 0.39 1
Product 3 0.79 0.21 1
Product 4 0.20 0.65 0.49 1
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: Chi-Squared(6) = 360.285, Pr = 0.00  
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Table 9. SUR Model for Open-Ended Treatments 
Product 1 Product 2 Product 3 Product 4
Subjects 242 242 242 242
R-Squared 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.13
Prob > Chi-Squared       0.01 0.08 0.01 0.00
Treatment Indicators
Non-Hypothetical Base Base Base Base
Non-Hypothetical BDM 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.05
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)
Hypothetical 0.29* 0.18 0.35** 0.39**
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
Cheap Talk -0.07 -0.08 0.05 0.03
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
Demographics
Age 0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
People at home under 14 years 0.11** 0.17** 0.23**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
People at home between 26-50 years -0.21** -0.15* -0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Education Indicators
Education less than 12 years 0.43* -0.22
(0.23) (0.24)
Education 12 years 0.19 -0.19
(0.13) (0.14)
Education between 12 and 16 years 0.19 -0.10
(0.13) (0.14)
Education 16 years 0.19 -0.17
(0.13) (0.14)
Education more than 16 years Base Base
Gender Indicators
Female Base Base
Male 0.24** 0.26**
(0.10) (0.09)
Race Indicators 
White Base Base
Hispanic -0.06 -0.005
(0.12) (0.12)
African-American -0.07 0.04
(0.16) (0.15)
Asian 0.03 -0.15
(0.20) (0.19)
Other 0.09 0.00
(0.27) (0.26)
Primary Household Shopper Indicators
Yes 0.23** 0.15
(0.10) (0.10)
No Base Base
Situational Indicators
Familiar with the Raw Product -0.02 0.02
(0.10) (0.09)
Unfamiliar with the Raw Product Base Base
Hungry or Thirsty -0.04 0.05 -0.02
(0.12) (0.09) (0.11)
Not Hungry or Thirsty Base Base Base
Intercept 1.28** 0.93** 1.59** 1.16**
(0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.16)
(*) significance value at 10% level; (**) significance value at 5% level
Open-Ended Treatments (1 to 4)
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Table 10. SUR Model for Conjoint Analysis Treatments 
Product 1 Product 2 Product 3 Product 4
Subjects 237 237 237 237
R-Squared 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.09
Prob > Chi-Squared       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Treatment Indicators
Non-Hypothetical Base Base Base Base
Non-Hypothetical BDM 0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.06
(0.22) (0.15) (0.24) (0.18)
Hypothetical 0.36* 0.05 0.66** 0.34**
(0.20) (0.14) (0.22) (0.16)
Cheap Talk -0.15 0.05 -0.18 0.02
(0.21) (0.14) (0.23) (0.17)
Demographics
Age -0.005 -0.01** -0.01**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
People at home under 14 years -0.23** -0.26**
(0.09) (0.09)
People at home between 26-50 years 0.26** 0.24**
(0.10) (0.10)
Education Indicators
Education less than 12 years -0.31 -0.68* -0.30
(0.36) (0.42) (0.24)
Education 12 years 0.22 0.25 -0.10
(0.24) (0.27) (0.16)
Education between 12 and 16 years 0.41* 0.14 -0.26*
(0.22) (0.26) (0.15)
Education 16 years 0.36 0.09 -0.28*
(0.23) (0.26) (0.15)
Education more than 16 years Base Base Base
Gender Indicators
Female Base Base
Male 0.21** 0.25**
(0.10) (0.10)
Race Indicators 
White Base Base
Hispanic 0.53** 0.42**
(0.12) (0.10)
African-American 0.42** 0.38**
(0.13) (0.11)
Asian 0.06 0.05
(0.20) (0.18)
Other 0.11 0.06
(0.26) (0.23)
Primary Household Shopper Indicators
Yes 0.06 0.14
(0.12) (0.13)
No Base Base
Situational Indicators
Familiar with the Raw Product -0.01 0.002 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unfamiliar with the Raw Product Base Base Base Base
Hungry or Thirsty 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Not Hungry or Thirsty Base Base Base Base
Rating of Task Complexity 0.04** 0.02 0.072**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Intercept 0.87** 0.54** 1.57** 1.01**
(0.24) (0.19) (0.30) (0.27)
(*) significance value at 10% level; (**) significance value at 5% level
Conjoint Analysis Treatments (5 to 8)
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Random-Effect Tobit Model 
Pooling all the data provides 499 subjects (cross sections) and four WTP estimates 
per subject. The dependent variable is the subject’s bid level, and independent variables 
include a set of indicator variables for both product and treatment.  In this way, we are able 
to isolate the cheap talk treatments and compare them to the hypothetical and non-
hypothetical treatments.  As was the case with the SUR approach, we are able to test for 
significant differences conditional on the demographic and consumption factors.  However, 
a key difference is that we impose a common vector of explanatory variables using the 
random-effect Tobit model in place of SUR. Considering the data set characteristics, we 
believe that the SUR approach and the random-effect Tobit can offer complementary 
approaches to help us fully understand cheap talk effect on the consumer purchase process. 
With respect to the random-effect Tobit model, each of the following Tables 
(Tables 11 and 12) has models using non-hypothetical and non-hypothetical BDM 
treatments as base. Table 11 shows the random-effect Tobit model for OE treatments using 
a restricted and full datasets.  We use a restricted dataset in order to isolate the cheap talk 
effect and the full dataset in order to compare our results to the SUR model.  At the 
attribute level, product 2 and product 4 (both with preservatives) have a lower WTP 
compared to product 1, and with a difference close to -$0.25. This fact is consistent with 
previous findings that show that non-preservative attributes are more valuable to 
consumers than the change in type of product form (from cubes to segments). The WTP 
for the change in product form was not significantly different from zero. At the treatment 
level, the non-hypothetical and cheap treatments generated statistically lower WTP 
estimations than the hypothetical treatment. In other words, we tested that cheap talk is 
effective in eliminating the hypothetical bias in both OE tasks conditional on demographic 
and consumption factors.  Consistent with our findings using the SUR approach, we do not 
have clear significant trends with respect to the demographic and consumption variables.  
In this case, most of the WTP variation is captured by the type of product and treatment.   
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Table 11. Random-Effect Tobit Model for Open-Ended Treatments 
Data Set Treatments 1,3 and 4 1 to 4 2,3 and 4 1 to 4
n 812 976 692 976
Subjects 203 244 173 244
Prob > Chi-Squared       0 0 0 0
Product Indicators
Product 1 Base Base Base Base
Product 2 -0.25** -0.24** -0.22** -0.24**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Product 3 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Product 4 -0.27** -0.25** -0.19** -0.25**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Treatment Indicators
Non-Hypothetical Base Base -0.02
(0.16)
Non-Hypothetical BDM 0.02 Base Base
(0.16)
Hypothetical 0.28* 0.30** 0.29* 0.29*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17)
Cheap Talk 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.01
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17)
Demographics
Age 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.002
(0.01) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
People at home under 14 years 0.28** 0.19** 0.18** 0.19**
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
People at home older than 50 years -0.19* -0.13 -0.11 -0.13
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Gender Indicators
Female Base Base Base Base
Male 0.20 0.20* 0.18 0.20*
(0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Marital Indicators
Married or Other Base Base Base Base
Single -0.01 0.002 -0.04 0.002
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Situational Indicators
Familiar with the Raw Product -0.005 0.05 0.02 0.05
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Unfamiliar with the Raw Product Base Base Base Base
Hungry or Thirsty 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.16
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12)
Not Hungry or Thirsty Base Base Base Base
Intercept 1.14** 1.12** 1.33** 1.14**
(0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.29)
Sigma_u 0.79** 0.79** 0.74** 0.79**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Sigma_e 0.60** 0.59** 0.54** 0.59**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Rho 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.64
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(*) significance value at 10% level; (**) significance value at 5% level
Treatment 1 as Base Treatment 2 as Base
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Table 12 shows the random-effect Tobit model for CA using both the restricted and 
the full dataset, as we did with Table 11 for OE treatments. At the attribute level, product 2 
and product 4 (both with preservatives) have a lower WTP compared to product 1.  The 
WTP for the product with preservatives is around -$0.80 and -$0.50 for the cubed and 
segmented forms, respectively. Respondents indicated a WTP around $0.30 for the 
segmented product. Consistent with the OE estimations, the non-preservative attribute is 
more valuable to the subjects than the change in product form.  At the treatment level, the 
non-hypothetical and cheap talk treatments generated statistically lower WTP estimations 
than the hypothetical treatment.  Also, as found before, we do not find clear demographic 
or consumption trends.  Consequently, consistent in sign with our previous results, we find 
that hypothetical estimations are statistically different from non-hypothetical treatments.  
In addition, we see that non-hypothetical BDM treatments generate significantly lower 
WTP estimations than hypothetical treatments.  Finally, the non-preservative attribute is 
consistently negative and significant. Thus, these results show the robustness of our 
previous findings.   
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Table 12. Random-Effect Tobit Model for Conjoint Analysis Treatments 
Data Set Treatments 5,7 and 8 5 to 8 6,7 and 8 5 to 8
n 816 1016 728 1016
Subjects 204 254 182 254
Prob > Chi-Squared       0 0 0 0
Product Indicators
Product 1 Base Base Base Base
Product 2 -0.76** -0.80** -0.83** -0.80**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
Product 3 0.31** 0.28** 0.28** 0.28**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
Product 4 -0.46** -0.52** -0.53** -0.52**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
Treatment Indicators
Non-Hypothetical Base Base 0.02
(0.22)
Non-Hypothetical BDM -0.02 Base Base
(0.22)
Hypothetical 0.36* 0.34* 0.36* 0.36*
(0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21)
Cheap Talk -0.19 -0.20 -0.18 -0.18
(0.20) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23)
Demographics
Age -0.01 -0.02** -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
People at home under 14 years -0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
People at home older than 50 years 0.01 0.19 0.13 0.19
(0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14)
Race Indicators 
White Base Base Base Base
Hispanic 0.41* 0.34* 0.25 0.34*
(0.22) (0.20) (0.24) (0.20)
African-American 0.32 0.27 0.19 0.27
(0.22) (0.21) (0.25) (0.21)
Asian 0.31 0.25 0.54 0.25
(0.40) (0.36) (0.44) (0.36)
Other 0.58 0.47 0.48 0.47
(0.52) (0.46) (0.62) (0.46)
Gender Indicators
Female Base Base Base Base
Male 0.03 0.13 0.27 0.13
(0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16)
Marital Indicators
Married or Other Base Base Base Base
Single 0.19 0.14 0.01 0.14
(0.21) (0.19) (0.23) (0.19)
Situational Indicators
Familiar with the Raw Product -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.22) (0.01)
Unfamiliar with the Raw Product Base Base Base Base
Hungry or Thirsty 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Not Hungry or Thirsty Base Base Base Base
Intercept 1.30** 1.43** 1.52** 1.40**
(0.37) (0.33) (0.43) (0.34)
Sigma_u 1.00** 1.03** 1.04** 1.03**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
Sigma_e 0.95** 0.94** 0.98** 0.94**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Rho 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.55
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
(*) significance value at 10% level; (**) significance value at 5% level
Treatment 1 as Base Treatment 2 as Base
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Specifically, we address the cheap talk effect by analyzing subsets of data.  With 
the first sub-dataset, we want to isolate cheap talk treatments and be able to check the 
significance of two specific variables regarding cheap talk effectiveness.  These questions 
were included only in the cheap talk treatments.  So, the first subset of data only utilized 
the cheap talk treatments (treatments 4 and 8).  In Table 13, we find that the cheap talk 
effects on the WTP estimates highly depend on the elicitation mechanism. Cheap talk CA 
estimates are significantly lower than OE estimations. From a product point of view, 
consistent with previous findings, products 2 and 4 (with preservatives) have the lowest 
WTP estimates, whereas the non-preservatives attribute had a value of $0.30 to $0.32.  
Murphy, Stevens, and Weatherhead (2005) found that 56% of people who read 
cheap talk paragraph expressed that they reduced their WTP after considering the cheap 
talk script. The rest of the sample explained that they were not influenced by the script. In 
our case, 8% of the subjects expressed that their evaluation was highly influenced, 31% 
were somewhat affected, and 61% experienced a low effect from the cheap talk script. On 
a scale from 1 (not affected at all) to 10 (really affected), we found the cheap talk script 
had, on average, an influence of 4.23 in the OE task and 4.01 for CA. In order to test these 
differences, we use a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions.  We do not find a significant difference in the elicitation mechanism in the cheap 
talk treatment estimations (OE and CA) with respect to the difficulty of the cheap talk task 
was for the subject and how much influence it is expected to have in the valuation. With 
respect to treatment, on a scale from 1 (very easy) to 10 (very difficult), subjects gave an 
average rating for the OE elicitation mechanism of 1.89; while the CA average rating was 
2.47.   
In the second subsets of data (Table 14), we compared non-hypothetical BDM and 
cheap talk treatments.  So, the sub-dataset includes treatments 2 and 4 for the OE group 
and treatments 6 and 8 for the CA group. In doing, we are able to isolate non-hypothetical 
BDM and cheap talk treatments.  As we expected, treatment and product indicators are 
highly significant.  Products 2 and 4 have negative coefficients and the CA estimates were 
more negative than the OE estimates. As shown previously, there is no significant 
difference between non-hypothetical BDM and cheap talk treatment estimates and no clear 
demographic or consumption consumer profiles found within the analysis.     
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Table 13. Comparison between Cheap Talk Treatments 
Data Set Treatments 4 and 8 (cheap talk)
n 516
Subjects 129
Prob > chi2       0
Product Indicators
Product 1 Base
Product 2 -0.32**
(0.09)
Product 3 0.10
(0.09)
Product 4 -0.30**
(0.09)
Treatment Indicators
Open-Ended Cheap Talk Base
Conjoint Analysis Cheap Talk -0.66**
(0.18)
Demographics
Age -0.01
(0.01)
People at home under 14 years 0.20*
(0.12)
People at home older than 50 years -0.10
(0.16)
Gender Indicator
Female Base
Male 0.30*
(0.17)
Marital Indicators
Married or Other Base
Single -0.20
(0.20)
Situational Indicators
Familiar with the Raw Product -0.09
(0.19)
Unamiliar with the Raw Product Base
Hungry or Thirsty 0.27
(0.18)
Not Hungry or Thirsty Base
Cheap Talk 
Impact in WTP 0.01
(0.03)
Understanding Level 0.12**
(0.04)
Intercept 1.22**
(0.38)
Sigma_u 0.87**
(0.07)
Sigma_e 0.72**
(0.03)
Rho 0.59
(0.04)
(*) significance value at 10% level; (**) significance value at 5% level  
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Table 14. Comparison between BDM1 and Cheap Talk Treatments 
Data Set Treatments 2 and 4 (open-ended) 6 to 8 (conjoint analysis)
n 456 436
Subjects 114 109
Prob > chi2       0 0
Product Indicators
Product 1 Base Base
Product 2 -0.19** -0.72**
(0.07) (0.14)
Product 3 0.09 0.13
(0.07) (0.14)
Product 4 -0.20** -0.59**
(0.07) (0.14)
Treatment Indicators
Non Hypothetical BDM Base Base
Cheap Talk -0.05 -0.22
(0.15) (0.25)
Demographics
Age -0.005 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
People at home under 14 years 0.10 0.25*
(0.09) (0.15)
People at home older than 50 years -0.10 0.40*
(0.14) (0.23)
Gender Indicator
Female Base Base
Male 0.26* 0.48**
(0.15) (0.25)
Marital Indicator
Married or Other Base Base
Single -0.31* 0.22
(0.18) (0.30)
Situational Indicator
Familiar with the Raw Product 0.06 0.05
(0.17) (0.29)
Unfamiliar with the Raw Product Base Base
Hungry or Thirsty 0.19 0.51*
(0.18) (0.28)
Not Hungry or Thirsty Base Base
Intercept 1.52** 0.67
(0.37) (0.61)
Sigma_u 0.76** 1.12**
(0.05) (0.10)
Sigma_e 0.51** 0.95**
(0.02) (0.04)
Rho 0.69 0.58
(0.04) (0.05)
(*) significance value at 10% level; (**) significance value at 5% level
1 Becker, Degroot, and Marshack mechanism
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Table 15 shows the estimated coefficients of the difference between the OE and the 
respective CA treatment.  We found that the non-hypothetical BDM mechanism reduces, 
and cheap talk increases, the difference in the estimation between elicitation mechanisms.   
 
Table 15. Random-Effect Tobit Coefficient Comparing Pairs of Treatments 
Non-Hypothetical -0.41**
(0.19)
Non-Hypothetical BDM -0.37*
(0.22)
Hypothetical -0.44**
(0.16)
Cheap Talk -0.66**
(0.18)
(*) significance value at 10% level; (**) significance value at 5% level
Notes: The complete model includes the same vector of variables. The base
 is the respective open-ended treatment.  
 
In the next two Tables, we present estimations that are discussed and compared 
with past research in the discussion section. First, regarding familiarity, Lusk (2003a), 
using a mailed survey for golden rise, found that subjects who had prior knowledge of the 
elicited product did not have a significant reduction in WTP because of the cheap talk.  In 
addition, subjects with no previous knowledge had a significant reduction in WTP after the 
cheap talk script. In addition, List (2001) found that card dealers did not have hypothetical 
bias and non-card dealers were biased. We used a familiarity index if the subject was from 
the production area or had previously tried the raw product.  Texas grapefruit production is 
located exclusively in the Rio Grande Valley (South Texas), so we consider it likely that a 
subject from the production area or who had consumed the product before would have a 
significantly different prior knowledge or experience than the general population, and thus 
affect the WTP estimation. Using that definition of a familiar subject, we found that 75% 
and 77% of the subjects were familiar with the product for the OE and CA treatments, 
respectively.   
Table 16 shows that subjects that are familiar with the product (also called familiar 
subjects) do not have significant hypothetical bias, since non-hypothetical BDM, 
hypothetical, and cheap talk treatments are not significantly different between them. At the 
same time, subjects that are unfamiliar with the product (also called unfamiliar subjects) do 
have hypothetical bias considering that non-hypothetical BDM and cheap talk treatments 
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are not significantly different between them, but they are significantly different from the 
hypothetical treatments. These results are consistent for the OE and CA treatments. 
 
Table 16. Testing for Hypothetical Bias in Familiar Subjects 
Familiar Unfamiliar Familiar Unfamiliar
Data Set Treatments 2,3 and 4 2,3 and 4 6,7 and 8 6,7 and 8
n 520 172 560 164
Subjects 130 43 140 41
Prob > Chi-Squared       0 0 0 0
Product Indicators
Product 1 Base Base Base Base
Product 2 -0.21** -0.27** -0.84** -0.79**
(0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.22)
Product 3 0.08 0.08 0.25** 0.33
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.22)
Product 4 -0.17** -0.24** -0.57** -0.40*
(0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.22)
Treatment Indicators
Non-Hypothetical BDM Base Base Base Base
Hypothetical 0.25 0.55* 0.19 1.17**
(0.19) (0.34) (0.25) (0.42)
Cheap Talk -0.11 0.17 -0.39 0.54
(0.18) (0.31) (0.27) (0.43)
Demographics
Age -0.0002 -0.02 -0.02** 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
People at home under 14 years 0.09 0.54** 0.07 0.21
(0.08) (0.14) (0.12) (0.26)
People at home older than 50 years -0.17 0.49 0.13 -0.08
(0.13) (0.46) (0.18) (0.37)
Gender Indicators
Female Base Base Base Base
Male 0.11 0.31 0.29 0.47
(0.15) (0.24) (0.21) (0.34)
Marital Indicators
Married or Other Base Base Base Base
Single -0.02 0.19 0.10 -0.37
(0.17) (0.29) (0.26) (0.50)
Intercept 1.51** 1.33** 1.73** 0.52
(0.31) (0.62) (0.45) (0.92)
Sigma_u 0.75** 0.65** 1.07** 0.90**
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14)
Sigma_e 0.56** 0.49** 0.99** 0.95**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07)
Rho 0.64 0.64 0.54 0.47
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09)
(*) significance value at 10% level; (**) significance value at 5% level
Open-Ended Conjoint Analysis
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Second, recently, there has been some research related with emotions and their 
effect on WTP estimations. Capra, Meer, and Lanier (2006) studied the effect of moods on 
bidding behavior using an nth price auction.  The authors found that moods have a 
significant impact on WTP estimations. Particularly, a subject in a positive mood overbid 
around 18% higher and a subject in a negative mood did not overbid.  The authors 
explained the overbidding behavior by suggesting that the subject in a positive mood can 
be less detail-oriented. According to Martin and Clore (2001), people in a negative mood 
tend to focus more critically on a task than people in a neutral or positive mood. In our 
case, we expect that being hungry or thirsty can be interpreted as a negative feeling. We 
found that 72% and 68% of the subjects in the OE and CA task reported they were hungry, 
thirsty, or both at the time of answering the survey. Table 17 shows that being hungry or 
thirsty can make a difference estimating the hypothetical bias in an OE mechanism.  
However, we did not find the same significance in CA estimates. 
As a summary of this chapter, complementing the results obtained using both the 
SUR and random-effect Tobit approaches; we find that there is consistency in the results of 
both approaches. Overall, the hypothetical treatments are significantly higher than the non-
hypothetical and cheap talk treatments.  Also, the last two were not significantly different 
when compared to each other.  Specifically regarding cheap talk, treatment effects are not 
significantly different across products; however, they are significantly different with 
respect to elicitation mechanisms, and some other factors such as familiarity and being 
hungry or thirsty. In the next chapter, we discuss these findings and present their 
managerial implications. 
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Table 17. Testing for Hypothetical Bias Hungry/Thirsty Subjects 
Hungry/Thirsty Not Hungry/Thirsty Hungry/Thirsty Not Hungry/Thirsty
Data Set Treatments 2,3 and 4 2,3 and 4 6,7 and 8 6,7 and 8
n 496 196 492 232
Subjects 124 49 123 58
Prob > Chi-Squared       0 0 0 0
Product Indicators
Product 1 Base Base Base Base
Product 2 -0.19** -0.29** -0.78** -0.95**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.19)
Product 3 0.10 0.03 0.25* 0.31*
(0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.18)
Product 4 -0.14** -0.32** -0.49** -0.63**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.19)
Treatment Indicators
Non-Hypothetical BDM Base Base Base Base
Hypothetical 0.25 0.61** 0.37 0.15
(0.19) (0.30) (0.24) (0.55)
Cheap Talk -0.003 0.12 -0.17 -0.39
(0.19) (0.29) (0.26) (0.57)
Demographics
Age -0.004 0.01 -0.03** 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
People at home under 14 years 0.19** 0.14 0.11 -0.09
(0.08) (0.18) (0.11) (0.27)
People at home older than 50 years -0.07 -0.33** 0.26 -0.22
(0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.34)
Gender Indicators
Female Base Base Base Base
Male 0.15 0.25 0.28 0.44
(0.16) (0.18) (0.20) (0.41)
Marital Indicators
Married or Other Base Base Base Base
Single 0.04 -0.08 0.01 -0.26
(0.18) (0.23) (0.24) (0.50)
Intercept 1.48** 0.77 1.85** 0.98
(0.32) (0.53) (0.45) (0.94)
Sigma_u 0.78** 0.61** 0.91** 1.27**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.16)
Sigma_e 0.56** 0.49** 1.01** 0.88**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
Rho 0.66 0.61 0.45 0.67
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
(*) significance value at 10% level; (**) significance value at 5% level
Open-Ended Conjoint Analysis
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 There is an agreement that people in hypothetical situations behave differently 
compared to those in real situations. Particularly in WTP studies, subjects tend to overstate 
their actual WTP.  Evidence of this hypothetical bias is widespread in CV studies 
(Cummings, Harrison, and Rutstrom 1995; List and Gallet 2001; Loomis et al. 1997; Neill 
et al. 1994) and is less frequent in CA (see Ding, Grewal, and Liechty 2005). Over the last 
decade, experimental economics have contributed to the increased realism of study 
settings, and therefore to the increased reliability of WTP estimates.   
In the literature review section, we reviewed some aspects that need to be taken 
into account for experimental design and implementation.  In addition, we presented EA 
and CA as alternative ways to measure WTP.  We discussed the cheap talk approach and 
incentive-aligned CA as techniques to reduce hypothetical bias and reviewed results of 
previous cheap talk studies, which have been conducted mainly in lab settings.   
We conducted a study that involved 499 subjects, eight treatments in select grocery 
stores in Texas.  We decided to conduct a retail study since that allowed us to take 
advantage of some of the benefits of field experiments. Lusk and Hudson (2004b) 
identified them as a way to easily focus in on a target population, lower experimental costs, 
reduce bias of high or non-uniform fees, and give a natural buying setting.  In addition, CA 
allows for the creation of an environment that considers substitute goods.  With respect to 
the task, we discussed some of the aspects that need to be covered in a cheap talk 
paragraph. According to Cummings and Taylor (1999), the length of their scripts makes 
their application in phone surveys difficult. For our study we were inspired by the 
Cummings and Taylor scripts, which have been widely used in experimental economics. 
However, we made it generic, shorter, and with neutral content.  We were looking for a 
generic script that would be easy to apply to other products.  Since we conducted our study 
in a retail setting, we needed to use a short cheap talk script that subjects could easily 
understand.  Finally, we wanted to use neutral content to avoid manipulating the subject’s 
answers to a particular side.  In other words, we wanted to make people aware about 
hypothetical bias, but not explicitly tell them what to do about it. Using the SUR approach 
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and random-effect Tobit models in the results section, we found that our cheap talk 
paragraph was effective in removing hypothetical bias in a retail setting.  Also, non-
hypothetical, non-hypothetical BDM, and cheap talk treatments did not generate 
significantly different WTP estimations. These findings were consistent for OE and CA 
estimations. At the same time, we found that cheap talk consistently eliminated the 
hypothetical bias, but did not have significant difference effect across products. In general, 
we found that hypothetical treatment and preservative content variables were significantly 
different from zero. In terms of the other variables, we did not find a significant set of 
demographic or consumption variables in common. 
We identified two factors that can effect WTP estimations: familiarity and 
hunger/thirst.  With respect to familiarity, Lusk (2003a), in a mailed cheap talk study, did 
not have a non-hypothetical reference point for comparison, so he could test whether 
hypothetical and cheap talk treatments are significantly different between them, but we do 
not have a non-hypothetical treatment to state that the hypothetical bias was removed.  In 
contrast, List (2001) was able to test the existence of hypothetical bias since he had non-
hypothetical and hypothetical treatments. Using sport cards, List found that card dealers 
did not have hypothetical bias and non-card dealers were biased. Consequently, the cheap 
talk effect is less severe or not significant for experienced subjects, since they are closer to 
the real value of the good.  In other words, it does not lower the WTP estimates when there 
is no hypothetical bias to begin with. Consistent with the previous research, in our study, 
we find that familiar subjects do not have significant hypothetical bias and unfamiliar 
subjects do have significant hypothetical bias. Considering a significance level of 5%, 
these results were robust for OE and CA treatments.   
With respect to emotions, we controlled for hunger/thirst. Since we do not have 
evidence how hunger/thirst affects non-hypothetical estimations, we cannot state that the 
hypothetical bias was removed. We can limit our analysis to test if there is statistical 
difference. As we expected, hunger and thirst datasets did not have significant difference 
with CA and OE treatments. In other words, non-hypothetical BDM, hypothetical, and 
cheap talk treatments are not significantly different from one another.  For the non-
hungry/thirsty group, as expected, the hypothetical treatment is significantly different. 
However, for non-hungry/thirsty subjects, the hypothetical treatment in the CA dataset is 
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not significantly different, which can be explained in two ways.  First, it could be that 
mood effects are a function of the type of task. Even for the non-hungry/thirsty dataset, 
since the CA treatments involve a bigger number of tradeoffs, it could be the case that the 
subject truly reveals his WTP. Second, it is possible that we need to control for the 
interaction of other emotional states like anger, empathy, or happiness. These variables can 
be significant by themselves or interact with other demographics or consumption variables. 
We suggest more research in this area, focusing on how emotions affect hypothetical and 
non-hypothetical elicitation mechanisms.  
When using experiments in a retail setting, our results suggested that indeed, 
consumers’ WTP values are influenced by the type of valuation or elicitation mechanism 
used, and also by the hypothetical/non-hypothetical nature of the valuation process. 
Interestingly, our findings suggest that OE WTP values are significantly higher than those 
obtained from CA. Consistent with Voelckner (2006), we found a significant difference in 
the values using OE and CA approaches. We offer two alternative explanations. First, as 
noticed by Champ et al. (1997), leaving room to express uncertainty in an experimental 
task can reduce the hypothetical bias and possibly some of the difference between 
elicitation mechanisms too, especially considering that uncertainty is often presented as a 
source of hypothetical bias. In other words, CA tasks involve purchase intention and not 
necessarily purchase action.  Second, CA tasks involve attribute trade-offs between close 
substitutes. In the literature, List and Shogren (1998) found that the inclusion of substitutes 
reduced the WTP in hypothetical and non-hypothetical studies, which is consistent with 
our findings.  Along the same line, Murphy et al. (2005) found that choice studies have less 
hypothetical bias. The authors suggest that fact since a choice-based experiment involves a 
trade-off of products, which makes explicit the substitution effect between close products. 
There is evidence that expressing WTP with substitutes generates lower estimates than 
without them.   
The natural question is to ask which elicitation mechanism generates the most 
reliable WTP estimation?  We have shown evidence that a single subject can have more 
than a single WTP value for a product based on their emotions or study specifications. 
Therefore, we believe that it is more fruitful to focus the WTP debate on the characteristics 
of the study and its subjects rather than try to shoot for the perfect number. For instance, a 
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reliable elicitation mechanism for market purposes would be incentive-compatible or it 
would have to have a way to control for hypothetical bias, consider substitution effects, 
and be elicited in a situation that mimics the point of purchase. We also recommend that 
market researchers view these elicitation mechanisms as complementary to each other 
rather than substitutes. For instance, experiences and values from a CA study can be used 
to better design EA and vice-versa. 
In the extant literature, random-effect models have been used to explain WTP 
estimations. From a methodology point of view, we suggested that SUR can play an 
interesting role in experimental economics. The SUR approach allowed us to gain degrees 
of freedom, to have independent explanatory variable vectors, and to assume correlated 
error terms.  Empirically, we found that the error terms were correlated and the set of 
variables which were significantly different from zero, were different for each product, 
even though the products were very similar.  In addition, the SUR approach allowed us to 
join hypothesis and test coefficient values, while imposing some theoretical restrictions. 
We do not believe that one approach is necessarily the best in all cases, but rather the SUR 
approach is a possible way to explain data variability. At present, we like the idea of being 
able to double-check our main findings using both mechanisms. 
From a managerial point of view, we identify two contributions.  First, managers 
can use the cheap talk approach to generate more reliable WTP estimations and avoid 
calibrating hypothetical estimations. As previously stated regarding calibration functions, 
List and Gallet (2001) recommended consideration of the type of good (public/private), 
elicitation mechanisms, and the type of study (willingness to pay/accept).  In addition, List 
and Shogren (1998) stated that calibration functions are good and context-specific and 
presented evidence that elicited goods in the presence of substitutes and experienced 
subjects reduced the hypothetical bias.  In summary, a reliable calibration function needs to 
be tailored to a particular study.  Instead, we offer a generic, short, and neutral script that 
allows itself to be applied in several formats and is a hypothetical approach that does not 
require a real product. Consequently, the cheap talk approach is presented as an attractive 
mechanism to obtain, eliminate, or at least to reduce hypothetical bias without further 
considering characteristics of the good. We recommend using this cheap talk script in 
future applications to have more robust findings.   
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As a second managerial contribution, the numerical estimations showed that 
subjects are more willing to pay for the non-preservative attribute rather than for additional 
value added to the product form. This finding has direct managerial implications, since 
decision makers can focus more to avoid the use of preservatives and use the product form 
that allows the longest shelf life. At the same time, since the non-preservative coefficients 
were around 0.25-0.75, we have an estimation of the WTP for that attribute that can be 
used to evaluate the feasibility of avoiding the use of preservatives.  
With regards to future research in the cheap talk area, research can test alternative 
cheap talk specifications and identify the most sensitive areas of it. Another topic can be to 
test whether our cheap talk script (short and neutral) generates significantly different 
estimates than Cummings and Taylor’s scripts (long and non-neutral), which is a reference 
in many cheap talk studies. Finally, we recommend continued work on the effect that 
emotions can have on WTP estimations and their interactions with other study 
specifications, such as setting, elicitation mechanism, or type of subjects. In the future, 
market researchers can use these psychological factors to determine proper marketing 
practices to commercialize the product in the marketplace. 
   In summary, previous research shows that a cheap talk script would be effective 
when the subject is committed to reading it, which is more likely to happen when it is short 
or there is a high payment level.  However, a high payment level can create endowment 
effects. So, a short cheap talk script can help researchers to commit subjects with a low 
payment level.  In contrast, long paragraphs in mail surveys add to the researcher 
uncertainty that the subject read or what portion the paragraph. Specifically, the researcher 
does not know of the paragraph was actually read.   
In our study, we have applied a generic, short, and neutral cheap talk script that 
eliminates the hypothetical bias in a retail setting.  Our results showed that the cheap talk 
treatment and the incentive-aligned estimates were not statistically different from one 
another. Since it is a short and neutral paragraph, it cannot be argued that the subjects were 
manipulated to either side, and the script is more compatible with time constraint study 
formats, as in phone surveys or retail studies. We encourage the continued use of this 
paragraph in future applications.   
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
 
 
Marketing Study 
 
TAMU project…please help us!! 
You need to be at least 18 years old 
Anonymous 
Payment: Up to $4 in cash per person 
Marketing study that lasts 5/10 minutes 
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Number :
Pic Set :
Interviewer :
Time :
Date :
TT :   
 
   
Welcome Questionnaire 
1. What is your gender?  
      
a) Male  
b) Female 
 
2. What year were you born?  
19____  
 
3. Which best describes your marital 
status? 
 
a) Single 
b) Married (or with a live-in partner) 
c) Other_____________(specify) 
 
4. What was your household income 
before taxes in 2005? 
    
a) Less than $19,999   
b) $20,000 - $39,999 
c) $40,000 - $59,999 
d) $60,000 - $79,999 
e) $80,000 - $99,999  
d) $100,000 and more 
 
5. How many people/roommates live in 
your household (fill each and include 
yourself)? 
____ under 14 years 
____  15-25 years 
____  26-50 years 
____ > 50 years 
 
6. What race/ethnic group best describes 
you? 
 
a) White 
b) Black/African-American 
c) Asian or Pacific Islander 
d) Native American 
e) Hispanic 
f) Other_____________(specify) 
 
7. What was the last level of education 
that you completed?  
(12 years = graduated from high school 
16 years = graduated college) 
 
  ___ number of years
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Product Weight 0.5  pound…please be careful with the order!!
Price ($)
A. Cubes with preservatives
Comments……………………………………………………...……………
B. Cubes without preservatives
Comments……………………………………………………...……………
C. Segments with preservatives
Comments……………………………………………………...……………
D. Segments without preservatives
Comments……………………………………………………...……………
General Comments……...………………………………………..
………………….…......……...…………………………………
………………….…......……...…………………………………  
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Bidding Letter
Paid Price  : $  
 
Exit Questionnaire  
 
1. Are you the primary household 
shopper? 
 
a) Yes       
b) No     
  
2. With regards to the product you 
purchased, rate how much interest you 
had in that product (It could be decimals) 
from 1 (very disinterested) to 10(very 
interested)                                     _____       
 
3. Rate how complex the study was for 
you (you can use decimals) from 1 (very 
easy) to 10 (very hard)        _____ 
 
4.  At this moment, are you hungry or 
thirsty? 
 
a) Hungry     
b) Thirsty     
c) Both     
d) Neither    
    
5. Do you eat grapefruit at least once a 
month from October to March (including 
juice)? 
 
a) Yes, please go to question 7  
b) No     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Why do you not eat grapefruit 
regularly (circle as many as apply)? 
 
a) Not sweet enough    
b) Taste (other than sweetness)  
c) Difficult to eat    
d) Allergies     
e) Medication     
f) Too expensive   
  
g) Other_____________(specify) 
  
7. How often do you purchase fresh 
grapefruit? 
        ____ times per month 
 
8. How much do you purchase when you 
buy? 
        ____ pounds 
 
9. Where do you generally purchase 
grapefruit?  
 
a) Grocery store    
b) Farmers market    
c) Roadside stand    
d) Other_____________(specify) 
  
10. Do you purchase grapefruit for a 
special occasion (circle as many as 
apply)?  
a) No      
b) Yes, so when?    
i1) Christmas   
i2) Special family events 
i3) Thanksgiving  
i4) New Year    
i5)Other_______(specify)  
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11. Where do you prefer your grapefruit 
to come from? 
14. Are you originally from a town that 
has less than 1,000 people? 
  
a) Texas      a) Yes      
b) The US, other than Texas   b) No     
  c) Origin does not matter    
Just for the Cheap Talk Survey… d) Other_____________(specify)  
   
12. Have you ever eaten a Texas 
grapefruit? 
15. Rate how much your evaluation was 
affected by the cheap talk script? (you 
can use decimals) from 1 (not affected at 
all) to 10 (really affected)           _____ 
 
a) Yes      
b) No       
c) Do not know   
  
16. How difficult was the cheap talk to 
understand?  (you can use decimals) from 
1 (very easy) to 10 (very hard)        _____ 13.  Are you originally from the Valley 
(South Texas)?  
 
a) Yes      
b) No     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
APPENDIX B 
CHEAP TALK SCRIPT 
 
"Studies show that people tend to act differently when they face hypothetical 
decisions.  In other words, they say one thing and do something different.  For example, 
some people state a price they would pay for an item, but they will not pay the price for the 
item even when they see this product in a grocery store. 
There can be several reasons for this different behavior.  It might be that it is too 
difficult to measure the impact of a purchase in the household budget.  Another possibility 
is that it might be difficult to visualize themselves getting the product from a grocery store 
shelf and paying for it.  Do you understand what I am talking about?   
We want you to behave in the same way that you would if you really had to pay for 
the product and take it home.  Please take into account how much you really want the 
product, as opposed to other alternatives of fresh-cut products that you like or any other 
constraints that might make you change your behavior, such as taste or your grocery 
budget. Now could you please tell me what price you are willing to pay for each of the 
following products?  Please try to really put yourself in a realistic situation." 
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APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTIONS PER TREATMENT 
 
General Instructions 
 I would like to ask your cooperation in a marketing study; you need to be older than 
eighteen years old.  Your participation is completely voluntary and you can leave at any 
minute.  If you stay until the end you will get four dollars or its equivalent in products to 
thank you for your cooperation.  Please start answering a welcome questionnaire and please 
let me know if you have any questions.   
 The whole survey will take around ten minutes; this should be the first and only time 
that you will participate in this study.  All the information collected is anonymous and will 
be used in group comparisons; no individual records will be published.  Please do not 
communicate with anyone while you are answering the questions and let me know of any 
questions that you have at any time. Please fill out the following questionnaire, and once you 
finish return it to me and I will explain the next step.  The surveyor checks that the 
questionnaire is complete and turns the page, which corresponds to the answer sheet for the 
conjoint analysis or open-ended procedure. 
 
Open-Ended Study (treatments 1 to 4) 
 Please check this set of four pictures.  Every picture represents a real product and we 
have a sample of it.  These pictures represent real grapefruit products.  You cannot buy more 
than one product.  Now, please write down the price that you will be willing to pay for every 
one of them.  Because we are interested in the value that you personally place on the items 
for sale, it is very important that you not talk to or try to communicate with the other 
participants. 
 The four dollars that you received as a participation fee do not relate to your bid, so, 
you are free to choose to spend any amount in a grapefruit product of the pictures.  The 
numbers that you write are your bids for these products and you would have to pay that price 
to get the specific product later on.   Please feel free to express your valuation of the good.  It 
is okay to write a zero or any larger number.   
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 Before doing the real valuation, I want to ask you some questions to help to 
understand the directions.  How many products will you be able to buy today?  What do the 
pictures represent?        
 
For the Non-Hypothetical Open-Ended Treatment (treatment 1)  
 After you finish writing down the prices, I will randomly determine the binding 
product.  You will be able to get the product if you just write down any positive number. If 
not, I will randomly pick another product until you get one.  In the case that all your prices 
are zero, you will be able to go home keeping the full four dollars.  Do you have any 
question?  So, at the end of the study, if you write the product four or more, you will go 
home with a half-pound grapefruit product and the remaining cash up to four dollars. 
 
For the Non-Hypothetical BDM Open-Ended Treatment (treatment 2) 
 After you finish writing your willingness to pay for each product, I will randomly 
determine a binding product.  You will be able to get a product if you just state that the 
price for that product is equal or higher than the random price.  If not, you will be able to 
go home keeping the full four dollars. Do you have any questions?  So, at the end of the 
study, if you price the binding product equal or higher than the market price, you will go 
home with a half-pound of that grapefruit product and the remaining cash up to four 
dollars. 
In this study, it is in your best interest to bid the amount that you are truly willing to 
pay to buy a grapefruit product.  If you bid more than your true willingness-to-pay you 
increase your chances of purchasing the product but you may have to pay a price that is 
greater than what you are willing to pay.  On the other hand, if you bid less than the 
amount that you are truly willing to pay, then you may lose the chance to purchase a 
grapefruit product at a price that you would be willing to pay.  
 Please remember that we will randomly determine the binding product and the price 
that you wrote is your bid.  Finally, we will draw another random number.  If your bid is 
equal to or higher than the random number, you will have to buy and take home the product 
and pay the amount that you wrote for it.  If your bid is less than the random number, you 
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will not be able to buy the product.  There is no right or wrong answer.  Do not hesitate to 
ask if you have questions. 
 
For the hypothetical open-ended treatment (treatment 3) 
Please write out the prices that truly represent your willingness to pay for each 
product.  You will receive a full four dollars as a participation fee. Let me know if you 
have any questions or something is not completely clear for you. 
 
For the hypothetical open-ended cheap talk treatment (treatment 4) 
I would ask you to go over the following paragraph.  After, please write out the 
prices that truly represent your willingness to pay for each product.  You will receive the 
full four dollars as a participation fee. Let me know if you have any question or something 
is not complete clear for you. 
 
Read aloud the picture label when you show it and let the subject bid for it 
  
 Do these bids represent your real willingness to pay for each product?  If you want, at 
this time, you can change your bid. 
 
Let the subject change his bid. 
  
 I would like to ask you to fill out the exit questionnaire.  Thank you very much for 
your cooperation.  We will be performing this study most of the day; please do not reveal 
details of the study to anybody.   
 
Money payment minus actual product price for non-hypothetical treatments and $4 for 
hypothetical treatments.  
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Conjoint Analysis Study (treatments 5 to 8) 
 You will see a set of pictures of value-added grapefruit product.  Each picture is 
labeled with its content, which corresponds to a half-pound of the product. I need you to rate 
them on a scale from one to seven, one being the worst and seven the best. If you don’t like 
any of them you can choose rate one all options. There is no right or wrong answer.  Do not 
hesitate to ask if you have any questions. 
 
For the non-hypothetical conjoint analysis treatment (treatment 5) 
 After you finish rating, I will randomly determine the binding product.  You will be 
able to get the product if you just rate that the product is equal to or higher than four.  If 
not, I will randomly pick another product until you get one.  In the case that all your rates 
are lower than four, you will be able to go home keeping the full four dollars.  Do you have 
any questions?  So, at the end of the study, if you rate a picture four or more, you will go 
home with a half-pound grapefruit product and the remaining cash up to four dollars. 
 
For the non-hypothetical BDM conjoint analysis treatment (treatment 6) 
 After you finish rating, I will randomly determine three binding products.  You will 
be able to get one of them if you just rate that the product is equal to or higher than four.  If 
not, you will be able to go home keeping the full four dollars. Do you have any questions?  
So, at the end of the study, if you rate a binding product a four or a higher score, you will 
go home with a half-pound of that grapefruit product and the remaining cash up to four 
dollars. 
 Please remember that I will randomly determine the binding products, and the price 
that you list for that product is your bid.  We will draw another random number, which will 
be the market price.  If your bid is equal to or higher than the random number, you will have 
to buy and take home the product and pay the amount that you bid for it.  If your bid is less 
than the random number, you will not be able to buy the product.  There is no right or wrong 
answer.  Do not hesitate to ask if you have any questions. 
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For the hypothetical conjoint analysis treatment (treatment 7) 
 Please write out the prices that truly represent your rate for each product.  You will 
receive full four dollars as a participation fee. Let me know if you have any questions or if 
something is not completely clear for you.    
 
For the cheap talk conjoint analysis treatment (treatment 8) 
I would ask you to go over the following paragraph.  After that, please write out the 
prices that truly represent your rate for each product.  You will receive a full four dollars as 
a participation fee. Let me know if you have any questions or if something is not 
completely clear for you. 
 
Read aloud the picture label when you show it and let the subject rate it 
  
 Do these rates represent your real willingness to pay for each product?  If you want, 
at this time, you can change your rates. 
 
Let the subject change his rate 
 
 I would like to ask you to fill out the exit questionnaire.  Thank you very much for 
your cooperation. We will be performing this study most of the day; please do not reveal 
details of the study to anybody.   
 
Money payment minus actual product price for non-hypothetical treatments and $4 for 
hypothetical treatments.  
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